With the introduction of semi-presidentialism in the 1978 Constitution, the Sri Lankan parliament became a minor actor within the constitutional framework. While the Constitution’s Nineteenth Amendment tried to establish several constitutional centres of responsibility, the parliament’s role remained minor. Simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies have been proposed by the NITI Aayog and other government institutions in India to reduce the disruptions caused by frequent elections, which include high costs, administrative burdens, communal violence, policy manipulation, and so on. I argue for the necessity of additional reform to change the parliament from a peripheral to a core role in the constitutional framework, using the example of German limited parliamentarianism. Reforms should attempt to constitutionalize parties, enhance the parliament’s institutional powers, and ensure that the parliament’s composition is regulated. Proposals are founded on the incorrect premise that simultaneity is dependent on these processes. Simultaneity may be adopted without incurring accountability costs, according to our findings. In order to attain government stability, they make the system inflexible, undermine democratic and federalist ideals, and diminish executive responsibility to the legislature, undermining a key tenet.
Keywords: Legislature, executive accountability, knowledge valorization, parliamentarian democracy, variability
