The Ethics of Emotions and Moral Judgement: A Critical Study of Martha Nussbaum’s Ethical Framework (Published)
This research examines Martha Nussbaum’s Ethics of Emotion, focusing on how emotions play a significant role in moral philosophy. Traditionally, emotions have been seen as irrational forces that should be controlled or excluded from ethical reasoning, but Nussbaum challenged the traditional view of emotions, by presenting emotions as forms of judgment that reflect our values, attachments, and sense of what matters. This paper aims to understand how emotions work alongside with reason in shaping moral judgment and guiding ethical choices. The project begins by examining the historical background that influences Nussbaum’s thinking, especially the ethical theories of Ancient Greek philosophers like Aristotle, as well as developments in hellenistic, modern, contemporary, and feminist philosophy. This paper involves close reading and interpretation of Nussbaum’s major philosophical works, supported by relevant academic commentary. Through this approach, the research uncovers how Nussbaum defines emotions as cognitive judgments and why she believes they are essential to understanding human experience and making sound moral decisions. The findings reveal that Nussbaum’s theory of emotion is relevant in moral philosophy. Emotions are not treated as distractions or personal weaknesses, but as necessary tools for navigating moral situations. The implications of this work suggest that any ethical system that ignores or downplays the role of emotion risks being incomplete.
Keywords: Emotions, Ethics, Reason, eudaimonia, moral philosophy