Materialism and Commodifcation of Delegacy: A Political Economy of Vote Buying/Selling In 2014 Pdp Governorship Primary in Nasarawa State, Nigeria (Published)
Party politics in Nigeria is essentially a market scenario whereof political power, patronage and votes are objects of economic transaction. Driven by the logic of materialism and opportunism, the average Nigerian politician sees politics as a premium investment as well as an avenue for material accumulation and aggrandizement. Partisan relations in this context are characteristically commoditized in such a manner that passes for buying and selling of electoral patronage and votes. This paper examines this trend with particular reference to the 2014 PDP primary election in Nasarawa State. By way of a purposive survey conducted on a cross-section of delegates to the 2014 PDP primary elections in the State, the paper observes that vote buying/selling played a significant role in determining the outcome of the elections. The paper reveals that most of the delegates were approached with pecuniary offers by agents of political aspirants in a bid to influence their voting choices. Although there was no ample empirical evidence to prove that the delegates were actually compromised in the process, circumstantial evidence suggests that some of the delegates must have voted based on material inducement. The paper thus submits that vote buying/selling is an important determinant of electoral victory in primary elections in Nigeria. More empirical studies are required in other parts of the country to validate the findings of this study.
Keywords: Commodification, Delegacy, Materialism, Opportunism, Political Economy, Selling, Vote Buying
The Political Economy of Deregulation Policy in the Downstream Sector of the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (1999-2015) (Published)
Successive governments in Nigeria since 1999 have faced the challenge of whether or not to adopt deregulation policy in the downstream sector of the petroleum industry. In fact, the decision of whether or not to adopt deregulation policy as a panacea for remedying the perennial fuel scarcity and arbitrary price increases in petroleum products has been an albatross around successive governments in Nigeria. This paper interrogates the political economy of deregulation policy in the downstream sector of the petroleum industry in Nigeria since the enthronement of democratic rule in 1999, hence contends that the subsidy regime of successive governments has not addressed the perennial scarcity and arbitrary price increases of petroleum products in the country. The paper maintains that the fuel subsidy regime has been an epitome of corruption as it has failed to address the original intentions of its founding fathers. It is the view of this paper, therefore, that a complete deregulation policy in the downstream sector that will ensure government’s outright removal of fuel subsidy, remains the only antidote to addressing the perennial scarcity and arbitrary price increases of petroleum products by ambitious petroleum marketers in Nigeria. It is by so doing that market forces shall become the major determinants of the prices and distribution of petroleum products for the teeming consumers in Nigeria. The paper concludes that savings that would accrue from fuel subsidy removal could be channelled into addressing the ailing infrastructure and human capital in the country
Keywords: Political Economy, deregulation policy, downstream sector & petroleum industry
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE CONTENDING ISSUES (Published)
An enquiry into the economies of such federations as the United States, Canada and Germany suggests that federalism is compatible with economic success. Such a proposition is, however, unsustainable considering the fact that India, Mexico and Nigeria, which are also federal states, have continuously performed poorly, reinforcing the view that a major explanation for the poor economic performance of the countries in the latter category lies in the manner in which their respective federal systems are operated. This paper therefore brings to the fore the nexus between Nigeria’s fiscal federalism and a lack of economic development in the oil-rich country. Our central argument is that Nigeria’s fiscal federalism has not spurred the desired development as envisaged by the architects of the system. The country’s over-dependence on oil, as well as the concentration of economic resources at the federal centre are at the heart of the country’s lack of economic success. Therefore, if Nigeria’s fiscal system is to achieve its economic objectives, the inherent contradiction manifesting in the over-centralisation of the federal system has to be addressed
Keywords: Economic Development, Fiscal federalism, Nigeria, Political Economy