

Eastern Europe Conflicts: Does Russia Occupies Ukraine?

Adekunle Alaye, PhD.

Department of Political Science

Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.

Oludare Ogunbanwo

Department of Area Studies, Mendel University Brno, Czech Republic

doi: <https://doi.org/10.37745/gjahss.2013/vol12n97393>

Published December 15, 2024

Citation: Alaye A. and Ogunbanwo O. (2024) Eastern Europe Conflicts: Does Russia Occupies Ukraine? *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol.12, No.9, pp.73-93

Abstract: *The overwhelming majority of the world considers Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, an unlawful occupation. Russia's seizure of Crimea was the first time since the Second World War that a European state annexed the territory of another. Although the Russian government denies it, Russian "volunteers" and regular troops are also present in the two self-proclaimed pro-Russian "people's republics" in the Donbas region near the Russian border. However, exploiting the late 14th-century decline of Mongol power, the Grand Principality of Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the latter eventually uniting with Poland) divided the former Russia lands. A new social group of Ukrainian Cossacks developed on the southern frontier of Poland, guarding it against Crimean Tatar raids. The Ukrainian Cossacks were a large group of free people, many of them were peasant serfs, who guarded the southern steppe border of Poland against Turkish and Tatar raids. The concept of 'Ukraine' already existed, but locals continued calling themselves 'Rusyns', while referring to the future Russians as 'Muscovites'. By the early 17th century, the Orthodox Christian population of the Ukrainian lands had become antagonized by Catholic Poland's religious policies and the spread of serfdom – a form of slavery in which peasants were bound to the land and sold with it. A 1648 Cossack rebellion led by Hetman (military leader) Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657) became a mass social and religious war against Polish rule, resulting in the creation of the Hetmanate, a Cossack polity nominally autonomous under the Polish king but independent in fact. Searching for allies against Poland, Khmelnytsky accepted the "protection" of the Orthodox Russian tsar in the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav. The exact meaning of "protection" continues to be debated today, but subsequent Russian policies affected the absorption of the Cossack lands, especially after Hetman Ivan Mazepa's (1639–1709) failed attempt in 1709 to break with Moscow.*

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, Europe, conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

Since Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, tensions with Russia have been palpable. Since then, Russian politicians, oligarchs, and corporations have had a significant impact on Ukraine, making it one of the strongest Russian satellite republics. Unfortunately, the demands of the Ukrainian people were poorly reflected by the corrupt and ineffective Ukrainian administration. Kyiv's Orange Revolution (2004-2005) marked a rejection of Russian political control over a constitutionally independent Ukraine and a desire to strengthen the country's democratic institutions. However, Ukrainian society is deeply split along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines, with certain parts, such as the Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces and the Crimean Peninsula, firmly identifying as belonging to Russia. The international crisis between the two governments started when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014. In this paper, I will examine potential resolutions to the conflict through the lens of a study of the social divide and the competing interests of domestic players in Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, the interests of external international players like the EU, the US, and the UN show how difficult it would be to resolve the dispute because of Vladimir Putin's uncompromising neo-imperial foreign policy. Because of Ukraine's strategically vital geopolitical location and the worsening of human rights on the Ukrainian territory, it will be claimed that a third party intervention and international action is necessary in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Background As nations go, Ukraine is a young one. After decades of control by Poland, Muscovy, and the Soviet Union in turn, it finally became independent in 1991. Orthodox Ukraine and "Catholic" Ukraine, or differences between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate, are examples of the religious and ethnic divisions within the country (Olzacka, 2017, 25). Because of these persistent gaps, Ukrainians' sense of national identity is still taking shape, which only makes matters worse. Ukraine's last official census was in 2001, therefore the data we have on its population is severely out of date. While just an estimate, it's one that helps put the pieces of this fight together. 77.8 percent were Ukrainians and 17.3 percent were Russians in 2001. In addition, 67.5% of Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian as their first language, while 29.6% spoke Russian (Central Intelligence Agency, 2001).

"Ukraine has been a region of rising divisions and tensions, partially inherited from difficult historical processes and partly formed throughout the post-Cold War period," (Lakomy 2016, 282). The nation is now riven by deep and entrenched divides, driven by competing interests. Many problems have arisen and hampered Russia and Ukraine's ties as a result of Ukraine's dependency on the Soviet Union and, later, the Russian Federation. While the Russian Empire had power over the majority of Ukraine, the Luhansk and Donetsk regions remained under the jurisdiction of a significant entity. Novorossiia (which literally translates to "New Russia") was that organization. The historical territory of Novorossiia stretches from Odessa to Donetsk and farther north to Dnipropetrovsk. Since then, these are the locations where the Russian national identity has grown

the most. It also prompted Russian claims that the area had always been part of Russia and so be under Russian rule. Long dependency on the Soviet Union and Russia exacerbated the country's already significant ethnic and linguistic divides, making it more difficult for Ukrainians to forge a unified national identity. As a result of Ukraine's status as a post-Soviet satellite state, tensions have persisted over whether it should align with the West (the European Union) or the East (the Russian Federation).

However, following Ukraine's independence in 1991, many Ukrainians sought to differentiate themselves from Poland to the west and Russia to the east. Numerous times, advocates of an independent Ukraine have spoken out against Russian efforts to increase Moscow's influence over the Ukrainian administration. The Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was a similar response to fraudulent presidential elections. For a long time, under Russia's tyrannical and oligarchical rule, the Ukrainian people believed they had no access to basic necessities like food, healthcare, and security. A series of demonstrations broke out in Kyiv's Independence Square and other major cities when the pro-Russian candidate, Victor Yanukovich, was declared the victor of the elections.

However, as pointed out by Kamil Zwolski (2018) the Russians saw it as Poland's effort to separate itself from Russia by freeing Ukraine of Russia's influence. The Ukrainian Supreme Court finally declared that the elections were fraudulent, putting an end to the crisis by nullifying the Central Election Commission's findings. Yushchenko, who ran on a platform of reducing Russian influence in Ukraine and ending oligarchic pressure on the government and its policies, eventually won the elections and took office as president.

Unfortunately for the Ukrainian people, Yushchenko did not deliver on his campaign promises, and the country is still dominated by unscrupulous Russian oligarchs. The European Union, which had some misgivings about Ukraine's European ambitions, was interested in Poland's effort and attempts to bring Ukraine closer to Western Europe, or possibly, to break off the Russo-Ukrainian relations (Zwolski, 2018, 183). The Eastern Partnership proposal was first suggested in 2008 by Poland's foreign minister Radosaw Sikorski and Sweden's foreign minister Carl Bildt to bring Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus closer to the European Union. European Commission (EC) adopted the proposal despite various objections regarding the effort. Western European nations realized they required Eastern European cooperation in forming the Mediterranean Union after the 2008 Russian military intervention in Georgia, when Sarkozy was elected president of France and proved more sensitive to Eastern problems (Zwolski, 2018). The EU and Ukraine hoped that their talks would result in an Association Agreement that would help institutionalize democracy in Ukraine. The discussions were expected to complete successfully in November 2013, and it seemed that everything was set for the contract to be inked. The Ukrainian government's decision to prioritize cooperation with Russia startled the public. The result was widespread unhappiness among Ukrainians, particularly in the West. One of the demands was the

re-adoption of the constitution from 2004, which limited the president's authority. However, the hesitation of revolutionaries towards President Yanukovich brought up another goal: his resignation. Known collectively as "Euromaidan," these protests were in response to Yanukovich's decision to cut ties with the Eastern Partnership in favor of a better economic relationship with Russia. Stakes for Russia and Ukraine It was revealed that a number of factors contributed to the escalation of tensions. The world community is worried about the war because of the intricate interplay of ethnic, religious, political, and economic interests. Also, Lakomy (2016), Mearsheimer (2014), and Zwolski (2015) all put a spotlight on the EU's involvement in the war (2018).

Studying the causes of the conflict is essential if we are to have a holistic understanding of it. Investigation of the conflict concerns, which may be broken down into five distinct classes, is important for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict. It has five distinct types:

- (1) Russian maintenance of post-Soviet states,
- (2) Ukraine's sovereignty,
- (3) Status of the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk,
- (4) Ukraine's sense of national identity
- (5) International alliances (with Ukraine being at the center of conflicting ideologies).

Ukrainian independence: 1918

With the collapse of the Russian monarchy in 1917 under the strain of war and political discord, patriotic Ukrainians established their coordinating body, the Central Rada (Council), which soon developed into a revolutionary parliament. The Russian Provisional Government granted Ukraine autonomy under the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), but the Bolsheviks subsequently refused to recognise it and invaded Ukraine in order to include it in the Soviet state. The UNR declared full independence in January 1918 and signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest before the Bolsheviks did the same. The German authorities installed a Ukrainian monarch under the historic title of hetman, but the UNR returned to power after the end of the First World War and proclaimed unification with the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The UNR could not survive the titanic clash between the Russian Reds and Whites during the Russian civil war (1917–22), as neither power recognised Ukrainian sovereignty, but the precedent of Ukrainian independence forced the Bolsheviks to create a Soviet Ukrainian Republic which in 1922 became a founding member of the Soviet Union.

However, in the early 1930s Stalin returned to the unfinished task of crushing the Ukrainian political nation, which developed during the Revolution. Some 4 million Ukrainian peasants perished in the state-engineered famine of 1932–33, which in Ukraine is known as the Holodomor ("murder through starvation") and considered a genocide – an interpretation increasingly accepted worldwide, but which Russia rejects. Stalin also destroyed the Ukrainian cultural elite and began promoting the tsarist notion of Ukrainians as the Russians' "younger brother."

The Enlarged Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic: 1945

Following up on his agreement with Hitler on the division of East-Central Europe between them, Stalin invaded Poland in September 1939 and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR the Ukrainian lands that Poland had kept after its brief war with the Bolsheviks in 1919, a stalemate which ended Lenin's dream of the Red cavalry bringing the revolution to Europe. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt allowed Stalin to keep these territories. The Soviets also pressured Czechoslovakia into giving up its "Rusyn" lands.

The resulting enlarged Ukrainian SSR came to incorporate nearly all the territories with an ethnic Ukrainian majority under its energetic party boss Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971). Khrushchev thereby achieved a longstanding aim of Ukrainian patriots to create a united Ukraine, but pursued a course of cultural assimilation into Russia rather than promoting Ukrainian autonomy. Stubborn armed resistance to Soviet rule by Ukrainian nationalists in the formerly Polish territories continued into the 1950s.

Russian Maintenance of Post-Soviet States

Imperial authority in the Russian Federation has a lengthy history. Much of its culture is permeated with arrogance and the desire to demonstrate superiority. Andreas Umland (2019) highlighted the significance of Ukraine to Putin by stating that the event prompted "largely manufactured, yet widespread collective agreement within large parts of Russia's population about the rightfulness, justice, and legitimacy of Moscow's various territorial, political, cultural, and economic claims towards Ukraine." According to him, the imperial expansion of Russia is "to the support, cohesion, and longevity of Putinist regime" (2019, 38). Putin's 2018 remarks at the Truth and Justice media event on grieving the demise of the USSR were representative of mainstream feeling in Russia (TASS, 2018).

In a 2017 survey by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 58% of the population expressed regret about the disintegration of the USSR. Since 1992, just eight percentage points of the people have decreased their regret at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the breakup of the united economic system and the fact that individuals no longer feel a part of a global superpower were named as the items that the Russians have felt the greatest nostalgia for during the last two decades (Levada Center, 2017). It seems that the Russians have been deprived of what Western Europeans have enjoyed for decade.

By striving to maintain spheres of influence in the post-Soviet republics, the Russian government seems to be compensating for this sentimentality by retaining control in these regions. Therefore, Putin's actions may be seen as a reflection of the desires and needs of the Russian people. The extent of his manipulation for his personal purposes will be investigated in a future section.

It is essential to note, however, that Russia's sustained backing for post-Soviet republics such as Ukraine is part of a bigger effort to unite the nation. In addition, it is a response to the eastward march of Western European states.

Ukraine's Sovereignty

Russia has been repeatedly violating Ukrainian territory since 1991. Russia's interference in its satellite state is not limited to the stated causes of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Instead of navigating international law and economic interdependence, President Putin would rather have influence over the person in command of the Ukrainian government. Despite Yushchenko's earlier efforts to take this strategically and economically crucial port, Russia's lease on its naval base in Sevastopol (the Crimean Peninsula) was extended under Yanukovich's presidency and will now last until 2042. As part of the deal, Russia agreed to lower the price of gas it exports to Ukraine. And many of the oligarchs that control the Ukrainian economy have financial links to the Russian government, banks, and other businesses (it was reported that the value of the assets of the hundred richest Ukrainians was equivalent to 23% of Ukraine's GDP (Datskevych, 2019)). Our analysis of their relevance to the ongoing conflict will have to wait for now. Then why is Ukraine's independence under more danger now than it was then? Putin makes it a point that his actions in foreign policy are legal under international law, or at least seem to be. Although the majority of UN members do not officially recognize Crimea as Russian territory, Russia has de facto control over the peninsula. Putin's future foreign policy initiatives in respect to Ukraine's sovereignty are less certain because of the precedent set by the annexation of Crimea, but the struggle in Donbass is more difficult.

Status of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk

On "February 27th and 28th [2014], pro-Russians seized key buildings in Simferopol and staged a referendum," a series of events led to Russia's annexation of Crimea. (2018). 83 percent of Crimeans voted, with 97% favoring joining Russia (CBS News, 2014). Russia demoralized the Ukrainian military in three weeks without using force. As said, Crimea's legal status is uncertain. Most countries and international organizations reject Putin's ethnic minority concerns. Despite Russia's protests, neither the existence of a Russian minority nor Yanukovich's invitation justify their military involvement and following referendum. Yanukovich's request and the deployment of Russian troops in Crimea are unclear.

In reaction to the Crimea referendum, pro-Russian protests were also conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk, which border Russia. In Luhansk and Donetsk, 39% of the population is ethnic Russian (Eurasian Geopolitics, 2014). In these areas, 92.7% of the population speaks Russian (Eurasian Geopolitics, 2014a). Donetsk and Luhansk are important due to their modern industry and natural resources. Pro-Russian groups proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk independent and renamed them People's Republics. Lakomy (2016) says Ukraine's internal issues sparked the war. Divergent viewpoints on European integration, Russia, common history, language, and culture, the post-

Euromaidan government, and ideology (Banderism vs. communism) cause conflicts in Ukraine (Lakomy, 2016, 291). Russia's military support for pro-Russian rebels and strong oligarchs worry Ukraine's government and President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Ukraine's sense of identity

The Ukrainians understood the need of enhancing their feeling of national identity. The fact that Ukraine is a multiethnic nation with sizable minorities, particularly Russians in the east, makes this identification rather difficult. Additionally, numerous spheres of influence have sought to affect it, including Poland and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. Lakomy (2016) and Zwolski (2018) proposed that one might see the development of Ukrainian identity as a reaction to the complexity of its situation in relation to Poland, Russia, the European Union, and, perhaps most significantly, in relation to itself. If Ukraine acted as a stopgap EU member state between Poland and Russia, Poland would feel more at ease. Polish policies seemed to view Ukraine as a tool for enhancing Poland's security. The Ukrainians must contend with Russia's desire to preserve its post-imperial status at the same time. As a result, Ukraine is split between its two neighbors, and this fragmentation hinders the growth of their feeling of national identity. Additionally, ideological divisions that pervade Ukrainian society make it difficult for a strong, cohesive national identity to form. While the majority of the Eastern Ukraine is made up of Russians, some individuals, particularly those who reside in Western Ukraine, would want to be a part of the European Union.

Global alliances (the West vs. Russia)

The West (the European Union, the United Nations, and NATO) and Russia represent two competing worldviews, and their war may be seen as a manifestation of this ideological struggle. Russia sees the European Union, NATO, the United Nations, and other nonprofit organizations, as well as the United States, as representatives of the liberal democratic position that threatens its very survival and its place as a global power. The Kremlin seems to be on its own while the network of intricate alliances works to limit the spread of Western ideology in the countries that were once part of the Soviet Union but are still heavily affected by Russia. The West's attempts to propagate Western ideals and foster democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics, a strategy that typically requires sponsoring pro-Western people and groups, were the "West's last instrument for peeling Kyiv away from Moscow," as noted by Mearsheimer (2014). However, the West worries about the rise of communist and, ironically, nationalist ideology in the Eastern European Union, and the protection of human rights in Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, the conflict appears to be even more complicated due to the questionable legality of actions taken by Russia, as it is ideologically motivated but having disputable positions with respect to international law not just for Ukraine and Russia, but also for the post-Soviet states, the European Union, and NATO. Politics, power, and special interests. The intricate interaction of the persons engaged and their specific goals in the dispute contribute to the conflict and make the impact of certain leaders and their interests vital for understanding the conflict.

Putin's influence on Russian politics, both domestic and international, cannot be denied. He spent a considerable amount of time in the Soviet armed forces before transitioning into politics. Putin is now in his fourth term as president, and he has also served as prime minister twice and as president once. More than twenty years have passed during his tenure as Russia's leader. Vladimir Putin is seen as an expansionist Soviet-style figure who continues the Soviet Union.. Putin wants Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk to be recognized as Russian territories and, perhaps, that he himself is recognized as the savior of Russian minority oppressed on the Ukrainian territory. Putin wants to maintain the Russian position of great power in the international arena, as well as his own position as the great leader of the Russian population. This is evidenced by the constitutional amendments in 2008 that introduced a six-year presidential term and by recent intended constitutional amendments that would allow Putin to run for a president again, for the fourth time. Moreover, the presidential elections that took place in 2018 were initially planned to take place on March 11 but this date was changed to March 18, thus, commemorating the annexation of Crimea. Valerie Sperling (2015, 282) noted that “At the center of Putin’s macho aura is his image as a tough guy who will not allow Western countries to weaken Russia by dictating what its domestic and foreign policies should be.” Such representation of Putin parallels with the divided perceptions regarding the conflict and whether it should be understood as the West’s fault, as suggested by Mearsheimer (2014), or Russian aggressiveness and lack of respect for international law. In 2019, in an interview, Putin said that “there are no common democratic standards” (Barber & Foy, 2019). This emphasizes the difficulty in imposing predominantly Western European democratic ideology on a region that is so divided in its perceptions of such ideology. According to Sperling, “Putin has fused a patriotic nationalism with sexual politics to frame the Ukraine crisis as part of a cultural battle with an amoral and untrustworthy West” (2015, 282).

In order to achieve his goals, Putin openly blamed NATO and the European Union for the crisis as they try to contain Russia. Moreover, the use of propaganda shaped the Russian’s perception of their leader: “The Kremlin’s message is that Putin will protect Russia’s national interests and the interests of Russians abroad, as in Crimea- and will do so unapologetically” (Sperling, 2015, 283). That Putin has successfully maintained the nostalgia for the Soviet tradition among Russian society can be observed based on the aforementioned statistics. In 2017, 58% of the interviewed Russian population stated they regret the collapse of the USSR, dropping from 66% in 1992 (Levada Center, 2017). Putin’s firm 17 position in regard to the conflict, his diplomatic expertise gained during the last two decades of governing the country, and his goals of uniting the Russian population hinder the resolution of the conflict. Such a resolution might necessitate a fundamental change in the attitude of the parties involved, yet Putin seems unshakeable, especially granted recent proposed constitutional amendments.

While it is much easier to point to a single leader in Russia due to Putin’s long-lasting high political position, the situation is not as clear in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have been dissatisfied with their presidents’ inability to fulfill the election promises. After the Orange Revolution Viktor

Yushchenko promised de-Sovietization of the government; however, due to divisions within his coalition, the reforms were thwarted and never implemented to the dissatisfaction of the majority of Ukrainians (Barrett, 2018, 89)

History of League of Nations

The League of Nations owed a great deal to the international Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907). According to Walther Schücking, a Neo-Kantian pacifist, the "Hague Confederation of States" was a worldwide alliance working toward disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes via arbitration. The concept of a peaceful international society is not new; Immanuel Kant addressed it in his work *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). After the failure of two Hague Peace Conferences, which were to be followed by a third in 1915, British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey seems to have come up with the concept for the genuine League of Nations. President Woodrow Wilson of the Democratic Party in the United States and his adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, were both very supportive of the plan since they saw it as a method to avoid another global conflict like World War I. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants to afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. This was the final point of Wilson's Fourteen Points for Peace and it was the foundation for the creation of the League. The League of Nations (French: *Société des Nations*; German: *Völkerbund*) was established on January 25, 1919, after a proposal to do so was agreed at the Paris Peace Conference. Part I of the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, and it established the League of Nations and had a special committee draft the Covenant of the League of Nations. As a preliminary step, 44 countries accepted the Charter; 31 of them had fought on the side of the Triple Entente or joined it after the war had already begun. In spite of Wilson's efforts, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919, the United States did not ratify the Charter or join the League. This was due to Wilson's stubbornness and the resistance from influential Republicans like Massachusetts' Henry Cabot Lodge and Idaho's William E. Borah. The inaugural meeting of the League took place in London on January 10, 1920. The first thing it did was sign the Treaty of Versailles, which put an end to World War I. The League moved its headquarters to Geneva on November 1st, 1920, and had its first general assembly there on November 15th, 1920, with the participation of 41 nations. David Kennedy, a professor at Harvard Law School, researched the League by looking at its foundational treaties, plenary meetings, and scholarly writings. According to Kennedy, the League of Nations marks the first time in history that international interactions were "institutionalized," as opposed to the pre-World War I legal and political institutions.

Historical development of G7

G7's codified international procedure The informal meeting cycle and contacts of finance ministry and central bank officials, called the club model of diplomacy, the K group, or the gaggle of G's, are far more recent than the IMF (1944) and the BIS (1930). 4 The G10 was created in 1961. The G10's original mission was to pool resources to support payments imbalances and provide

emergency liquidity. 5 In the early 1970s, the US wanted a smaller, more informal meeting to discuss the dissolution of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system and international monetary design, themes that were kept off the G10 agenda owing to US worries over European participation. 6 George Schultz invited his French, German, and British colleagues to the White House library in 1973. In September of the following year, at the annual IMF conference in Kenya, Japanese finance Minister Kiichi Aichi called the four 'Library Group' ministers to the house of the Japanese ambassador in Nairobi and obtained his colleagues' willingness to continue meeting. The 'Library Group' grew from four to five members and became permanent. Arthur Burns insisted on attending the following library group meeting, creating a precedent for central bank governors to join finance ministry colleagues. Thus, the G5 framework for finance ministers and central bank governors was developed. (Sobel, 2006).

The G5 became the G7 during the 1986 Tokyo meeting. Once Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, previously finance ministers, became presidents, the summits for leaders of state and government were founded in 1975 (from 1976 onwards, they gathered as a G7, and now G8) and patterned after the Library Group. Canadian and Italian pressure to match the G5 with G7 summity participation intensified after the September 1985 Plaza Agreement to steady the dollar's depreciation. After Italian threats to close American airbases, Ronald Reagan allowed Italy and Canada to join the G5, establishing a finance minister and central bank G7. 8 The G5 stopped meeting, and the G7 became the leading forum for international monetary and exchange rate policy. (2006 Stedman, Louellen).

Global response to the Invasion

the world's response to the invasion As a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the events that followed, several countries have put in place more and more financial, economic, and other sanctions. For a country with an economy as big and important as Russia's, these sanctions are the most severe ever. They have been added to the punishments that are already in place. • Fines are paid in cash. The EU, the US, and other countries have put in place sanctions that make it hard for the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to do its job (CBR). Because of them, the Russian government can't get to foreign currency reserves held by organizations in sanctioned nations or whose dissolution would require access to the financial systems of those nations. Because of this, about half of Russia's foreign currency reserves are frozen. Deals with Russia's National Wealth Fund and Ministry of Finance are also limited in the same way. One of the seven institutions that were cut off from the SWIFT financial communications network was VTB, the second largest bank in Russia. Direct sanctions against other well-known banks, like Russia's biggest bank, Sberbank, range from making it harder for them to use correspondent financial networks to making it illegal for them to do business with companies in punishing countries. Also, the US and UK have made it harder for companies to invest in Russia. This includes the energy industry and a number of other companies.

Putting a stop to trade. From the US, the EU, and other places, Russia is getting hit with more and more export bans, import restrictions, and other trade penalties. Export restrictions to Russia mostly affect "dual-use" technology, like semiconductors, as well as products and services used in the aviation, aerospace, oil and gas, and luxury goods industries. To cut down on imports from Russia, there are plans to buy less energy and a wide range of taxes, import bans, and other restrictions on other Russian goods and services. In terms of energy, the US has stopped buying any fossil fuels from Russia, and Japan, the EU, and the UK are all phasing out their oil and coal imports from Russia. Lithuania is the first country in Europe to stop buying Russian gas, and the EU is seriously considering putting sanctions on Russian oil as well. Also, the US, the EU, and the UK have made it illegal for Russian planes to fly in their airspace. Russia has responded by requiring payment in rubles for energy and putting new restrictions on export licenses, even within the Eurasian Economic Union, to make sure there is enough food for its own people (World Bank 2022b). Additional penalties Some Russian officials, lawmakers, and businesses have had a lot of asset freezes and travel restrictions put on them because of how much money they have or what they do with it. Also, more than 250 international companies have stopped doing business or making new investments in Russia, and more than 150 have said they are leaving the country completely. People and businesses in Belarus that are linked to Russia's invasion are subject to travel restrictions, asset freezes, and export restrictions. This includes financial institutions and businesses in the military and security sectors.

Impacts of the conflicts on Ukraine and Russia

Russia and Ukraine conflict has aggravated Ukraine humanitarian crisis. Damage to urban areas and disruptions to maritime, road, and rail transit are widespread. Electricity generating, digital infrastructure, bridges, and ports are destroyed or inoperable. Six million Ukrainians lacked clean drinking water as of March. As of mid-April, approximately 12 million people were displaced, and an equivalent number, especially the elderly and sick, require humanitarian aid (UNHCR 2022). War affects human capital greatly. It is projected to have an especially severe effect on children due to increased hunger and malnutrition, fewer school years, and poor labor-market results (Akresh, Caruso, and Thirumurthy 2022; Acosta et al. 2020).

Ukraine's economy is collapsing. The Ukrainian government has implemented emergency financial measures (such as capital controls and banking sector restrictions) and announced tax deferrals to support the economy and relieve pressure on foreign exchange reserves and banks, while meeting all domestic and external debt obligations in full. These safeguards prevented the financial system from imploding. Due to the conflict's damage of industrial infrastructure and company closures, many locations in Ukraine cannot support economic activity. Damaged transit routes have hampered land transportation, while Ukraine's inability to reach the Black Sea has halted maritime trade. Because half of Ukraine's exports are via sea, this disruption is disastrous.

The conflict is predicted to inflict a loss in production equivalent to 45% of GDP in 2022, according to the World Bank. (2022).

The projections assume the battle will last many months but remain in the same geographic locations. Ukraine will require foreign financial aid in the future, and its debt will almost probably need to be adjusted to allow for a strong rebuilding and recovery and to sustain economic viability. Russia's financial asset values have plunged, and the economy is anticipated to stay unstable. Dollar-denominated Russian debt yields have climbed, while the Moscow Stock Exchange stopped trading between February 25 and March 24 owing to falling share prices. Several prominent offshore exchanges have banned Russian asset trading. In early March, Deutsche Boerse banned all trading in Russian assets and shares. The ruble's value dropped 40% in two weeks after the crisis started, although it has since rebounded thanks to capital controls. Foreigners are prohibited from selling ruble-denominated assets or withdrawing foreign funds from Russia. The ruble's value has returned. Late in February, the CBR hiked its policy interest rate to 20%. When ruble pressures eased on April 8, the CBR cut it from 20% to 17%. This reduced ruble depreciation and inflation. In April, all European energy import bills must be in rubles, the Russian government determined at the end of March. Europe has fought against a planned change in payment conditions, and its implementation is questionable. The pricing of credit default swaps suggests a significant likelihood of eventual government collapse in Russia. In April, Russia tried to settle its international debt in rubles rather than dollars in response to US moves to prohibit dollar-based debt service payments. This enhanced a sovereign country's default risk. S&P Global Ratings then gave Russia a "selected default" rating, meaning it was doubtful that ruble payments would be converted to dollars during a 30-day grace period beginning April 4, 2022. Govind A creditor committee ruled on April 11 that Russian Railways defaulted on Swiss franc participation notes. This was Russia's first international default since the war (Strohecker and Do Rosario 2022).

Russia is nearing a recession. Because sanctions reduce domestic demand, high-frequency economic indicators hint to a considerable slowdown in March, with the composite PMI slipping further into negative territory. With the ruble's initial fall and supply limits, inflation soared from 9.2% in February to 16.7% in March. Russia's GDP is anticipated to decrease by almost 11% this year, despite original estimates of 2.4% increase (World Bank 2022b). The departure of numerous multinational firms from Russia, coupled with a dramatic worsening in the outlook, will dry up investment, while increasing prices and shrinking wages will weigh hard on family consumption; fiscal policy assistance will only partly counteract this. Reduced demand and export restrictions against Russia would increase foreign financing. In automotive and aerospace, the restriction of imports has already halted local output. Russian oil and gas import restrictions are projected to reduce exports this year. This projection uses market data. Software and semiconductors are now illegal to transfer to Russia, depriving the nation of crucial inputs and aggravating supply chain instability. Current sanctions will diminish Russia's oil output owing to the departure of

multinational oil businesses, a drop in investment, and restricted access to foreign technology. The penalties will cause this.

2014 Crimea Invasion

Unknown military personnel, later identified as Russian, invaded and took control of the Crimean peninsula's autonomous government in March 2014. On March 6, the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, with a referendum scheduled for March 16, 2014. Russia praised the decision, while Western countries were outraged. 11 On March 21, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Crimea's annexation law, formally incorporating Crimea into Russia, a process that is still ongoing. According to analysts, this is the largest land grab in Europe since World War II ended in 1945, which breaches core standards of international law and treaties and threatens Ukraine's territorial integrity (Merezhko,2015).

Historic development of NATO

Understanding the Alliance's present situation requires looking at its history. For this study, NATO's history may be divided into four historical periods: the Cold War (1949–1989), the Post–Cold War (1989–2001), the Post–September 11 era (2001–2014), and the Post–Ukrainian Crisis/Russian–Ukrainian War era (2014–present) (2014–present). The Cold War period spans 1949–1989 and 1989–2001. (2014-ongoing). Cold War conflicts between the US and USSR (1949-1989) During the Cold War, the Western bloc (the UN and its allies) and the Eastern bloc fought continuously. Cold War was this struggle (also known as the Soviet Union and its satellite nations). According to Eichler and Laml (2010), the founding of NATO represents the "strategic revolution" since Western European governments realized they couldn't protect themselves against a Soviet invasion. NATO's establishment is a "strategic revolution." The US and USSR, the Cold War's main protagonists, never went to war. This is a fascinating war fact. Every fight started with a skirmish (Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.). The alliance prevented a Soviet invasion of Western countries. The Cold War had three main phases: First came battles and nuclear deterrents. According to Rearden (1984), the Red Army of the Soviet Union "consist[ed] of 4,100,000 soldiers and had stabilized at roughly 175 line divisions" at the start of the Cold War. It may have attacked Western Europe. This competition initially raised the safety issue. It "describes a scenario in which one state's activities to strengthen its security, such as growing its military or creating alliances, may inspire comparable moves from other governments, raising tensions that lead to confrontation, even when neither side intends it." [Cite] The "The acts of one state to strengthen its security, such growing its military or creating alliances, may prompt comparable activities from other states (Jervis, 1978: 167-174). No military violence broke out because all parties took measures. Second, the fight between democratic capitalism and communist socialism resembles the Cold War. The Western bloc pushed for free trade, human rights, democracy, and free speech, in contrast to the Eastern bloc's centrally planned economy, communal ownership, and one-party rule. During Easter Block, media restrictions added insult to injury. Third, disconnecting from the economy. Economic isolation was another characteristic of the Cold War era. Each party lobbied for economic

ramifications while strengthening its supporters and proxies. After World War II, the U.S. created the Marshall Plan to help Western European countries recover economically and socially. The Soviet Union's reaction to the Marshall Plan was the "Molotov Plan" (Council for Mutual Economic Development). The organization's main goal was Eastern Bloc reconstruction. COMECON aimed to stop Soviet satellites from seeking support or recognition in Western Europe. Stalin "wanted to keep opposing powers out of buffer republics" rather than incorporate them into a new economy. Stalin wanted to contain rivals (Wallace and Clark, 1986). NATO had no strong military threat or strategic competitor after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. (1989-2001). NATO prioritized expanding the region's zone of peace and stability to communicate with former Soviet satellite states and promote for their admittance into NATO and other international organizations like the EU. The most major change is the shift from territorial defense to protecting the Alliance's security interests. Senator Lugar said in 1993 that NATO must "move out of the area" or "go out of business" for world security. 2012)

NATO may reassess security in light of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and failing and rogue states in the absence of its principal military and political nemesis. NATO was prepared to execute crisis management operations outside of its member states if threats rose. During this time, NATO was engaged in various foreign operations, including the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, the air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, and the KFOR mission. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the location. 9/11 (2001-2014) after 9/11, transatlantic nations and international organizations prioritized examining the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, rogue states, and failing states. 9/11 signaled stage two of NATO's post-Cold War development. During this period, NATO emphasized "active engagement in operations beyond the Alliance's sphere of responsibility" (outside the European territory). NATO members have improved their crisis management capabilities (Korba and Majer, n.d.). As a consequence, NATO shifted its priority from quick bombings to drawn-out ground offensives. Afghanistan and the Middle East constituted the Alliance's biggest danger at the moment, but the comparatively peaceful situation in Europe allowed for these strategic maneuvers since NATO nations had lost a significant military opponent in their immediate neighborhood. Afghanistan and the Middle East constituted the Alliance's biggest challenge. NATO "needs to restructure" to boost its international performance. Bator (2013) says the Alliance must "strengthen its operational capacity." [Cite] Foreign activities have improved interoperability across member nations, a priority for those wanting further collaboration. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has the longest continuous deployment of NATO forces outside of Europe (United Nations Security Council, 2001). ISAF's main aims were to punish Al Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks and to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan. Protecting Kabul from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda became the coalition's main priority. ISAF's mission was enlarged when NATO "took over from the UN (at Afghanistan's request)" in 2003. (2013) According to Bátor (2013), the ISAF goal was to build and improve the Afghan National

Security Forces so they could secure the whole country. This was done in Afghanistan to prevent it from becoming a terrorist sanctuary.

NATO's ability to "project troops and equipment" to Afghanistan from beyond Alliance territory was crucial to the success of allied counterinsurgency operations. In 2010, more over 100,000 troops were deployed to ISAF; in 2014, just 34,512 were, according to NATO sources (2014). The U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Georgia, Jordan, Turkey, and Australia contributed financially. The Russia-Ukraine War and Its Aftermath (2014-ongoing) Current phase of NATO development is the fourth, and conflicts in Eastern Europe may characterize it (since 2014). Ondrejcsák (2014) found three differences between this and the previous stage. First, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and takeover of the Crimean Peninsula revealed its threat to Europe and the Alliance. 2014 saw both events. Second, the absence of a "red line" at the start of the Russian invasion hindered NATO's response. Worse, Russia invaded Ukraine. Third, Central Europe lacked key infrastructure, and most NATO nations couldn't safeguard their borders. Peace in Europe and the absence of a military opponent near the Alliance's borders influenced certain members' defense expenditures. SIPRI reported that most governments cut military spending According to the revised Strategic Concept (Swami, 2010), the risk of a conventional military attack against NATO territory is "minimal." This didn't happen, therefore the Alliance had to act to reverse the worsening security situation and strengthen itself. Most governments prefer to increase their military spending to start. Some NATO member states made public vows to raise military expenditure a week before the NATO Summit to improve the alliance's capabilities to defend against Russian aggression. Croft says Poland's military spending would hit 2% of GDP by 2016. (2014). Latvia and Lithuania want to surpass 2% by 2020. Romania will raise military spending annually until 2016. The Czech government plans to restore recent cuts to military spending. Second priority is building CEE military infrastructure (military and logistical bases, joint military exercises). According to Ondrejcsák and Rhodes (2014), if ISAF's mission in Afghanistan ends, NATO interoperability will suffer. This would challenge NATO nations. The Allies were able to act and fight more effectively because they worked together on this operation. Ground Pepper, a joint military exercise at the Slovakian military installation Le, is one example. Many nations participated in Ground Pepper. After the Wales Summit, one of the key goals of the Alliance was to increase the interoperability of their military forces, which was also the declared purpose of this exercise (Maxim, 2014). (Maxim, 2014).

Third, the Alliance needs a stronger military presence in eastern members. According to the Wales Summit Declaration from 2014, "continuous air, land, and sea presence and considerable military actions in the eastern part of the Alliance" would be conducted. They may be adapted to changing security needs while building confidence and deterrence. These include "the deployment in March and April of six F-15 fighter jets to the Baltic Air Policing mission; the deployment in March of 12 F-16s and 300 personnel to Lask Air Base in Poland; the deployment of 175 marines to Romania to supplement the Black Sea rotational force; [...] and the deployment of 150 paratroopers to

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia;" "March's aviation (Belkin, 2014). Fourth, to strengthen the NATO Response Forces, NATO member states created the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force "by developing force packages that can respond to challenges and threats." The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) "may deploy within days" to respond to emergencies on NATO's border (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). It's part of the new Readiness Action Plan to improve state defenses. Ondrejcsák concludes that NATO "should consolidate existing relationships, start creating new ones from Moldavia to Central Asia, and re-launch the expansion process" (2014). According to a 2014 summit statement, NATO would continue to welcome "any European democracies that share our Alliance's ideals and are willing and able to embrace the responsibilities and obligations of membership." NATO members support Georgia's package, which includes "military capacity building," training, exercises, greater liaison, and better interoperability.

CONCLUSION

One of the fundamental empirical result of this paper is that it deeply analyzed the historic antecedent of the two major international organizations, the aim behind its establishment and their roles in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. On the other hand Negotiation is a better instrument to stop the conflict from escalating more further than it is right now, from my result so far only this can stop the menace is happening right, for the world to be a little peaceful it has to go back to it drawing board and negotiate. On the other hand the war has caused a lot on humanity crisis right from the distruction of lives and property to the drain in economy, food hunger etc. . Galvanizing these scenarios confirms that the impacts of the G7 and NATO in Russia and Ukraine crises, G7 have being able to give out sanctions while the NATO have being giving out Aids to Ukraine to continue with the war with Russia, there have been the assessment on the role of both the G7 and NATO generally and the presence/contribution to the ongoing war.

Recommendation

Sequel to findings in the research we recommend that proper peace negotiation in which such negotiation need to be mediated carefully, would create a stronger framework and more guidance for peace. Therefore, the current Russia-Ukraine talks are taking the form of classical diplomacy negotiations between states mediated by politicians. Professional peace mediators are not involved, international, professional experts on peace mediation could and should be involved in the Russia-Ukraine talks whether formally or informally. The havoc of the war on human crisis should be managed and stopped by ending the long time crisis.

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