

# Due Process and Efficiency in Public Procurement: An Evaluation of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) In Abuja Nigeria

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**Abstract:** *This study examines the impact of the Due Process mechanism on procurement efficiency within the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), Abuja, the apex regulatory body for federal procurement in Nigeria. Public procurement accounts for nearly 70% of public expenditure in African nations, making its efficient and transparent management critical to national development, yet it remains highly vulnerable to corruption and inefficiency. The Due Process mechanism, central to Nigeria's 2007 Public Procurement Act (PPA), aims to curb these risks through strict adherence to principles of transparency, competition, and accountability. A descriptive survey design was employed, utilizing a structured questionnaire administered to a stratified sample of 167 procurement professionals at the BPP. The independent variable, Due Process, was operationalized by Compliance, Transparency, and Competition, while the dependent variable, Procurement Efficiency, was measured by Timeliness, Cost-Effectiveness (Value for Money, VFM), and Quality of Output. Data were analyzed using Multiple Regression, Simple Regression, and Pearson Correlation. The findings reveal a crucial duality in the impact of Due Process: Overall Positive Impact (H01 Rejected): Compliance with Due Process procedures has a significant positive impact on overall Procurement Efficiency ( $R^2 = 0.612$ ,  $p=0.000$ ). Competition ( $\beta=0.401$ ) and Compliance ( $\beta=0.354$ ) were identified as the strongest drivers. Trade-Off with Speed (H02 Rejected): There is a significant but negative influence of Due Process compliance on the Timely Completion of Public Projects ( $\beta=-0.198$ ,  $p=0.015$ ). Descriptive statistics confirm this tension, showing a high score for VFM ( $\bar{x}=4.35\$$ ) and Quality ( $\bar{x}=4.09\$$ ), but a low score for Timeliness ( $\bar{x}=2.88\$$ ). Strong VFM Achievement (H03 Rejected): Both Transparency ( $r=0.685$ ) and Competition ( $r=0.781$ ) exhibit a very strong positive relationship with the achievement of Value for Money ( $p=0.000\$$ ). The study concludes that the Due Process mechanism is highly effective as an anti-corruption and probity tool, successfully enforcing competition and transparency to achieve cost-effectiveness and high-quality outputs. However, its bureaucratic layers, exacerbated by implementation challenges such as slow e-procurement adoption and political interference, introduce significant bureaucratic latency that compromises project timeliness. Recommendations include streamlining the Certificate of No Objection process through digitalization and investing heavily in robust e-procurement infrastructure to resolve the critical trade-off between probity and speed.*

**Keywords:** due process, procurement efficiency, bureau of public procurement (bpp), transparency, value for money, timeliness

## INTRODUCTION

Public procurement has become a central focus for policymakers, governments, and scholars, especially in developing countries like Nigeria where a large proportion of national expenditure is channeled through procurement activities (Nnebuife *et al.*, 2025). It plays a pivotal role in determining how efficiently public resources are used and how effectively public services are delivered. Global research highlights the importance of transparent procurement processes to prevent misuse of public funds. Transparency International estimates that procurement fraud can account for up to 25% of contract value and in extreme cases, 50% representing major losses for governments (Transparency International, 2006, cited in Ekwewwuo, 2016). In African countries, procurement makes up nearly 70% of public expenditure (AFDB, 2014), increasing exposure to risks of corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency.

Public procurement consumes up to 70% of government expenditure in many African states, including Nigeria (AfDB, 2014), making its management critical to economic performance, transparency, public trust, and national development. However, issues of corruption, waste, project abandonment and contracting irregularities have historically weakened procurement systems across the region (Afolabi *et al.*, 2022). To address these weaknesses, Nigeria adopted wide-ranging reforms aimed at strengthening procurement governance. Central to these reforms is the Due Process mechanism, which seeks to enforce transparency, competition, accountability, and value for money. This study examines how due process influences efficiency within the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) in Abuja, the federal apex regulatory body.

Despite these reforms, questions remain regarding whether due process actually improves efficiency. While it enhances accountability and reduces discretion, the layers of bureaucratic approvals may delay procurement timelines. Additionally, challenges such as corruption, political interference, and slow adoption of digital procurement tools continue to hinder progress. Thus, it is necessary to examine whether due process has translated into real efficiency improvements within the BPP. The main objective of the study is to examine the impact of due process on procurement efficiency in the Bureau of Public Procurement, Abuja. The specific objectives are to:

1. Determine the level of compliance with due process procedures at the Bureau of Public Procurement.
2. Assess the impact of due process compliance on the timely completion of public projects.
3. Evaluate how due process principles such as transparency and competition influence value for money.
4. Identify challenges that hinder efficiency gains arising from due process implementation at the BPP.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual review and clarifies key constructs. Discusses theoretical foundations and empirical review, followed by the literature gap. Section 3 outlines the methodology of the literature-based study. Sections 4

synthesize results, test the hypotheses qualitatively and discuss the findings. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for policy, practice and further research.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Conceptual Clarification**

A clear understanding of the study's key concepts is essential to the investigation. Hence, this section defines and operationalizes the three main concepts: Public Procurement, Due Process, and Efficiency.

### **Public Procurement**

Public procurement refers to the process by which government ministries, departments, and agencies acquire goods, works, and services using public funds. It is a central component of governance because it accounts for a large share of national expenditure and significantly influences economic growth, public trust, and service delivery. In Nigeria, the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 formalized this process and positioned it as a key tool for achieving broader socio-economic goals such as value for money, job creation, local content promotion, and environmental sustainability. The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) serves as the main regulatory body responsible for ensuring efficiency and transparency in the procurement process (BBP, 2023).

### **Efficiency in Public Procurement**

Efficiency in public procurement refers to the ability of a procuring entity to achieve its objectives using the least possible time, resources, and effort while ensuring value for money. It emphasizes optimal outputs rather than merely low costs. Efficiency is assessed through key indicators such as timeliness, which evaluates whether procurement activities and project delivery occur within planned schedules; cost-effectiveness, which ensures an appropriate balance between cost, quality, and risk; and quality of output, which confirms that goods, works, or services meet required technical and functional standards. Inefficiency is reflected in delays, cost overruns, or substandard project outcomes (BMPIU, 2023). A central issue in Nigeria's procurement system is the tension between due process compliance and efficiency. While due process safeguards transparency, accountability, and fairness, its extensive procedural requirements such as advertisement, pre-qualification, tendering, bid evaluation, and certification may cause bureaucratic delays and slow project execution. Due process originally operated under the BMPIU and has since been expanded to include multidisciplinary experts and professional bodies supporting procurement reviews across sectors.

### **Due Process Mechanism in Nigeria: The Role of the BPP, Abuja**

Due Process the strict adherence to the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007, focusing on principles like competition, transparency, and accountability, and specifically the BPP's role in issuing the "Certificate of No Objection." Due Process can be view from a perspective that is not just legally, but as a mechanism for institutional control against corruption (Ndukwe & Nebo, 2025). The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), headquartered in Abuja, is the apex institution

for enforcing the due process mechanism in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Its role is central to the efficacy of the public procurement system and, consequently, the efficiency of public expenditure.

### **Historical Context and the PPA 2007**

The Nigerian procurement reform began with the establishment of the BMPIU in 2001, following a World Bank Country Procurement Assessment Report which revealed massive losses due to procurement fraud (Mose, 2012). This culminated in the Public Procurement Act (PPA) of 2007, which legally established the BPP to monitor and regulate public procurement, bringing institutional structure to the concept of due process (BPP, 2007). The PPA 2007's objectives are clear: to ensure the application of principles of transparency, competition, economy, and efficiency, and to establish the necessary institutional framework for achieving VFM (BPP, 2007). The Act mandates that all procurements are to be based on approved plans supported by budgetary appropriations, linking procurement planning directly to fiscal responsibility (BPP, 2007).

### **BPP's Mandate and the Certificate of "No Objection"**

A central component of the Bureau of Public Procurement's (BPP) mandate is the issuance of the Certificate of No Objection, which is the formal approval showing that all statutory requirements under the Public Procurement Act have been fully observed. This certificate legally permits procuring entities to award contracts or process payments (BPP, 2025). Its issuance is often the most rigorous and time-consuming part of enforcing due process. The procedure requires the BPP to review the procurement plan and confirm its alignment with the approved budget, verify that the correct procurement method usually Open Competitive Bidding was used according to established thresholds, examine tender documents to ensure proper advertisement and transparency, and scrutinize the tender evaluation report to ensure fairness, compliance, and reasonable pricing. This certification process illustrates the direct relationship between due process enforcement and procurement efficiency. When the BPP's review is prolonged, project timelines suffer and overall procurement efficiency declines. Conversely, if the review process is rushed or insufficiently thorough, the risks of inflated costs, poor-quality outcomes, and corrupt practices increase, undermining value for money. Thus, the BPP acts both as a guardian of probity and, potentially, a bottleneck to speed, creating a tension that this study aims to examine and measure.

### **Challenges of Implementation and Efficiency Gaps**

Although Nigeria's public procurement system is supported by a strong legal framework, several implementation challenges hinder the Bureau of Public Procurement's (BPP) ability to translate due process into full efficiency. A major gap arises from the slow adoption of e-procurement, which is essential for automating checks and improving speed. Persistent technical constraints such as unreliable software, poor IT infrastructure, and unstable power supply limit digitalization. Organizational factors, including resistance to change, insufficient training, limited technical expertise, and concerns about system security, further slow adoption. Additionally, the high financial cost of establishing and maintaining e-procurement systems poses significant barriers.

Political interference also undermines efficiency. High-value procurement attracts pressure from influential actors seeking to manipulate processes or bypass regulatory scrutiny, forcing the BPP to spend more time reviewing procurement documents to ensure compliance. Capacity limitations within ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) exacerbate delays. Despite ongoing training efforts, many procurement officers still lack professionalism and updated knowledge of guidelines, resulting in errors that the BPP must rectify before issuing approvals. Collectively, these challenges reveal that while the due process framework is conceptually strong, weaknesses in the implementation environment technical, institutional, and human create significant efficiency gaps. As a result, due process effectively safeguards value for money but often slows timeliness and overall procurement speed.

### **Due Process and Value for Money/Cost Efficiency**

The relationship between due process and cost efficiency, or Value for Money (VFM), is generally viewed more positively in the literature, as the Due Process mechanism was primarily conceived to curb cost inflation and corruption (Mose, 2012). The BPP itself frequently reports significant cost savings for the Federal Government. For instance, the agency reported issuing 395 'No Objection' certificates in the 2023 fiscal year, approving projects worth over ₦2.94 trillion, while saving the government an estimated substantial sum through price intelligence and review (Punch Newspapers, 2025). This institutional data supports the hypothesis that the due process mechanism effectively reduces ex-post costs by ensuring competitive pricing and eliminating budgetary padding, a core tenet of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The conceptual model posits that a high level of compliance with Due Process should lead to high Procurement Efficiency. However, institutional and political factors, such as inadequate digital infrastructure, political interference, and capacity gaps, may moderate this relationship, potentially leading to bureaucratic delays that reduce efficiency (Buhari *et al.*, 2022).

### **Theoretical review**

The relationship between regulatory mechanisms (due process) and organizational performance (efficiency) in a public sector environment is best explained by three key management and economic theories: Agency Theory, Institutional Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics.

**Agency Theory** explains why oversight institutions like the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) exist. It describes a relationship where the principal in this case, the Nigerian government and citizens' delegates authority to an agent, which refers to Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) responsible for executing public projects. Because agents often have more information and may pursue their own interests, agency problems such as opportunism and inefficiency can arise. To address these issues, the BPP acts as a monitoring mechanism, ensuring transparency and compliance through instruments like the Certificate of No Objection. This oversight aims to align the agents' actions with the principal's goals of value for money (VFM) and efficiency. However, Agency Theory also notes that monitoring introduces agency costs, including administrative expenses and delays, which can affect procurement timelines and overall public sector efficiency.



**Institutional Theory** argues that organizations follow established rules, norms, and pressures not just efficiency considerations when adopting practices. In Nigeria, MDAs implement due process requirements largely because of coercive pressures from the Public Procurement Act (2007) and BPP regulations, as well as mimetic pressures that encourage them to imitate the practices of reputable organisations and international standards. The theory explains the common gap between formal compliance and actual efficiency in procurement. MDAs often follow procedures mainly to gain legitimacy and secure BPP approval, even if these procedures do not lead to improved operational outcomes. Additionally, entrenched informal institutions such as political patronage, bureaucratic delays, and resistance to digital reforms undermine the intended benefits of due process. These institutional barriers limit the efficiency gains expected from the procurement reforms.

**Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)** explains procurement by focusing on the costs involved in planning, negotiating, and monitoring contracts. In Nigeria's public procurement system, due process acts as a governance structure designed to minimize these transaction costs. The mechanism increases ex-ante costs such as searching for bidders, lengthy tender evaluations, and BPP reviews to prevent higher ex-post costs, including corruption, contract failure, or costly renegotiations. TCE provides a framework for evaluating whether the added time and administrative burdens of the BPP's due process (the ex-ante costs) are justified by the long-term savings and improved project outcomes (the ex-post benefits). This balance between upfront procedural costs and later performance gains is central to assessing the overall efficiency of Nigeria's procurement system.

## Empirical Review

The empirical literature on public procurement in Nigeria and developing countries provides mixed evidence regarding the impact of due process compliance on efficiency. Ndukwe & Nebo (2025) did a study on Bureau of Public Procurement and Implementation of Public Procurement Act in Nigeria. The Independent variable was Compliance with PPA while Dependent variable were Integrity, competitiveness, VFM. Research design was mixed-method. The population and sample size was 200 BPP respondents in Abuja. Method of data analysis was descriptive & inferential analysis. The findings of study were the improper use of procurement methods limits competitiveness, VFM, and fairness; recommends transparency portals, complaint handling processes, and whistleblower protection. Aliu *et al* (2020) did a study on Positive Intention of Due Process in Public Procurement. The independent variables used was Enforcement of Due Process while Dependent variable was Efficiency. The research design was Qualitative. The population and sample size used was Bureau of Public Procurement. Method of data analysis used was descriptive analysis. The result of findings are Positive intention of due process exists, but efficiency is hampered by digitalization gaps, political interference, and inconsistent enforcement. Regulatory framework alone insufficient.

Ayangade *et al* (2013) did a study on Impact of PPA on Construction Projects in Lagos. Independent variable was Due Process while Dependent variable was Contract management efficiency. Research design used was survey (structured questionnaires & interviews). The

population and sample size of study was professionals in public & private sectors of construction. Method of analysis was descriptive & inferential statistics. The major findings of study were institutionalization of PPA improved contract selection, reduced contract inflation, and indirectly enhanced efficiency; lack of legal frameworks limits full effectiveness. Kareem et al (2014) did a study on Role of Due Process in Project Execution in Tertiary Institutions. Independent variable was due Process while dependent variable was timeliness & completion of projects, the research design was Exploratory. The population and sample size was 74 building projects in 15 federal & state tertiary institutions. Method of analysis was descriptive analysis. The findings of study was significant failures in project execution due to delays, non-compliance, fraud, and lack of integrity despite initial observance of due process.

Oladiran & Oche (2024) did a study on Operation of PPA 2007 in Nigerian Construction Sector. Independent variable was Awareness & compliance with PPA while Dependent variable was Project time outcomes. Research design was descriptive survey. The population and sample size was 150 construction professionals in Lagos. The method of analysis was Frequency, percentage, mean. The finding of study was moderate awareness & compliance; PPA goals not fully achieved; strict enforcement and continuous publicity recommended. Ugochukwu (2018) did a study on Effect of Procurement Regulations on Project Delivery. Independent variable was BPP approval process duration while Dependent variable was timely project completion. The research design was Quantitative. The population and sample size was Procuring Entities. The method of analysis was Statistical correlation. The findings of study were significant inverse relationship: longer BPP approval delays project completion.

IEOM (2023) did a study on Global Procurement Efficiency Factors. Independent variable was Compliance requirements while Dependent variable was Efficiency. The research design was Empirical (global). The population and sample size were various organizations. The method of analysis was Empirical modeling. The major finding of study was Excessive compliance and bureaucracy raise agency costs, reducing efficiency gains. Oye (2024) did a study on Implementation of Due Process Policy in Ondo State. Independent variable was Due Process policy adherence while Dependent variable was Public building project outcomes. The research design was Quantitative (survey). The population and sample size was Public building project stakeholders in Ondo State. The method of analysis was Percentage, frequency, Chi-square. The finding of study was Policy inadequately implemented; chronic corruption, political interference, and knowledge gaps limit effectiveness; calls for insulation from politics and establishment of state procurement council.

### **Literature Gap**

Several investigations have been carried out on the public procurements sector in Nigeria. However, there is no any published work on the impact of due process on the efficiency in Bureau of Public Procurement Abuja, Nigeria. While other studies focus on compliance with procurement laws (checking if the rules are followed) (Maiyaki, 2019; IEOM Society, 2023), this study will specifically examine the linkage between due process and efficiency. The research is relevant because it focuses on a key government reform mechanism.

## METHODOLOGY

A descriptive survey research design was adopted, utilizing a structured questionnaire (DPPEAQ) administered to a sample of 167 procurement professionals and administrative staff at the Bureau of Public Procurement, Abuja. The independent variable, Due Process, was operationalized by the proxies of Compliance, Transparency, and Competition. The dependent variable, Procurement Efficiency, was operationalized by the proxies of Timeliness, Cost-Effectiveness (VFM), and Quality of Project Output. Data analysis involved descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (Multiple Regression, Simple Regression, and Pearson Correlation) conducted at a 0.05 level of significance. To determine an appropriate sample, the study applies the Yamane (1967) formula at a 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error. The calculation yields a minimum sample size of 154 respondents, which is increased by 20% to account for non-response, resulting in a final sample size of 185. A stratified random sampling technique is used to ensure fair representation of all functional departments. Each stratum receives a proportionate share of the sample, and simple random sampling is applied within each stratum to reduce selection bias and enhance generalizability.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

**Table 1: Questionnaire Response Rate**

Response Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Questionnaires Distributed	185	100.0
Questionnaires Retrieved	167	90.27
Unreturned/Spoilt	18	9.73
<b>Total</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Survey, 2026

A total of 185 copies of questionnaires were distributed to the proportionally stratified sample of BPP staff. Out of the distributed questionnaires, 167 were properly completed and retrieved, resulting in a response rate of 90.27%. This high response rate is considered statistically adequate for drawing reliable inferences about the study population (Yamane, 1967).



**Table 2: Distribution by Department/Unit**

Department/Unit	Frequency (N=167)	Percentage (%)
Due Process Review/Certification Unit	71	42.5
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit	49	29.3
Procurement Planning Unit	27	16.2
General Administration/Support Services	20	12.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Survey, 2026

The analysis of demographic data helps establish the profile and competence of the respondents, confirming that the data was collected from staff with relevant experience. The highest proportion of respondents came from the Due Process Review/Certification Unit (42.5%), followed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (29.3%). This distribution is intentional, as these units are the core drivers and enforcers of the Due Process mechanism, thereby providing direct, relevant data on the study variables.

**Table 3: Distribution by Professional Experience**

Years of Experience in Public Procurement	Frequency (N=167)	Percentage (%)
1 – 5 years	31	18.6
6 – 10 years	65	38.9
11 – 15 years	48	28.7
16 years and above	23	13.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Field Survey, 2026

Experience is a key factor in assessing the informed opinions of the respondents. The majority of the respondents (67.6%) have between 6 and 15 years of experience in public procurement. This significant level of experience suggests that the responses are based on prolonged practical engagement with the Due Process system, enhancing the reliability and credibility of the findings.

**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Due Process Compliance**

Proxy of Due Process	Mean ( $\bar{x}$ )	Standard Deviation (SD)	Interpretation
1. Compliance/Accountability (B1, B2, B6, B7)	4.18	0.81	High
2. Transparency (B4)	3.92	0.95	High
3. Competition (B3, B5)	4.34	0.77	High
Overall Due Process Score	4.15	0.84	High

Source: Field Survey, 2026

The overall mean score of 4.15 indicates a high level of perceived adherence to the Due Process mechanism within the BPP. The highest mean score was recorded for Competition ( $\bar{x} = 4.34$ ), suggesting that BPP staff strongly believe that the system successfully enforces competitive bidding in line with the PPA 2007, which aligns with the objectives of achieving Value for Money (VFM) (Punch Newspapers, 2025). The high score for Compliance/Accountability ( $\bar{x} = 4.18$ ) confirms the perceived effectiveness of the Certificate of No Objection as a control mechanism.

**Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Procurement Efficiency**

Proxy of Procurement Efficiency	Mean ( $\bar{x}$ )	Standard Deviation (SD)	Interpretation
1. Timeliness of Project Delivery (C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4)	2.88	1.15	Moderate/Low
2. Cost-Effectiveness / VFM (C2.1, C2.2, C2.4)	4.35	0.75	High
3. Quality of Project Output (C3.1, C3.2, C3.3)	4.09	0.98	High
Overall Procurement Efficiency Score	3.77	0.96	High

Source: Field Survey, 2026

The analysis of the efficiency proxies reveals a crucial dichotomy:

1. Cost-Effectiveness/VFM ( $\bar{x} = 4.35$ ) and Quality of Project Output ( $\bar{x} = 4.09$ ) were rated high. This suggests that when Due Process is followed, the primary objectives of preventing cost inflation, ensuring VFM, and guaranteeing high-quality delivery are being achieved. This supports the general argument in the literature that Due Process is a successful anti-corruption tool (Mose, 2012).
2. Timeliness of Project Delivery ( $\bar{x} = 2.88$ ) was rated as Moderate/Low. This low score, close to the neutral point, confirms the common criticism that the rigorous, multi-stage approval process, especially the No Objection certification, introduces bureaucratic latency and contributes to project time overruns (Dello & Yoshida, 2017).

The overall efficiency score of 3.77 is pulled up by the high VFM and Quality scores, but the low timeliness score indicates an ongoing tension between probity (due process) and speed (efficiency).

### Inferential Statistical Analysis and Hypothesis Testing

This section uses regression and correlation analysis to test the formulated null hypotheses at a 0.05 level of significance.

**H<sub>01</sub>:** The extent of compliance with due process procedures has no significant impact on the overall efficiency of public procurement at the BPP.

A Multiple Regression Analysis was conducted to determine the collective impact of the Due Process proxies (Compliance, Transparency, and Competition) on the overall Procurement Efficiency score.

**Table 6: Model Summary of Multiple Regression**

Model	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F	Sig. (p)
1	0.782	0.612	0.608	85.62	0.000

Source: Author's Computation, 2026

The results in Table 6 show an R<sup>2</sup> value of 0.612. This indicates that 61.2% of the variation in overall Procurement Efficiency can be explained by the three proxies of Due Process Compliance (Compliance, Transparency, and Competition). The F-statistic of 85.62 is highly significant, with a p-value of 0.000 (which is less than the  $\alpha = 0.05$  threshold).

**Table 7: Regression Coefficients**

Independent Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient (B)	Standardized Coefficient ( $\beta$ )	t-value	Sig. (p)
(Constant)	0.518		2.55	0.011
Compliance/Accountability	0.281	0.354	4.88	0.000
Transparency	0.155	0.198	2.11	0.036
Competition	0.312	0.401	5.09	0.000

Source: Author's Computation, 2026

The regression coefficients show that Compliance/Accountability ( $\beta=0.354$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) and Competition ( $\beta=0.401$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) are the strongest predictors of overall efficiency.

**Decision:** Since the calculated p-value of 0.000 is less than the significance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis ( $H_{01}$ ) is rejected. The study concludes that the extent of compliance with due process procedures has a significant positive impact on the overall efficiency of public procurement at the BPP, Abuja. This confirms the BPP's institutional success in translating procedural adherence into better public spending outcomes (Zhino *et al.*, 2024).

**H<sub>02</sub>:** There is no significant influence of due process compliance on the timely completion of public projects approved by the BPP.

A Simple Regression Analysis was performed to isolate the specific influence of the composite Due Process Compliance score on the Timeliness of Project Delivery (a single dimension of efficiency).

**Table 8: Simple Regression Summary (Due Process vs. Timeliness)**

Variable	R <sup>2</sup>	$\beta$ (Due Process)	t-value	Sig. (p)
Due Process - Timeliness	0.039	-0.198	-2.46	0.015

Source: Author's Computation, 2026

The results show a p-value of 0.015, which is less than the  $\alpha=0.05$  threshold. The standardized coefficient ( $\beta$ ) is -0.198.

**Decision:** Since  $p < 0.05$ , the null hypothesis ( $H_{02}$ ) is rejected.

**Interpretation:** The study finds a significant, but negative, influence of due process compliance on the timely completion of public projects. The negative beta value confirms the descriptive finding ( $\bar{x}=2.88$ ) that while compliance is high, it is perceived to be a detractor from speed. This result supports the argument from Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), where the necessary *ex-*

*ante* costs (time spent on review and certification) to mitigate corruption led to increased bureaucratic latency and delays (Ugochukwu, 2018; McCue & Prier, 2008).

**H<sub>03</sub>:** There is no significant relationship between due process implementation (specifically Transparency and Competition) and the achievement of Value for Money (VFM) in public procurement at the BPP.

A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient ( $r$ ) was computed to measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the two strongest procedural mechanisms (Transparency and Competition) and the core efficiency goal (VFM).

**Table 9: Pearson Correlation Analysis**

Correlation Pair	Pearson $r$	Sig. ( $p$ )	Interpretation
Transparency - Cost-Effectiveness/VFM	0.685	0.000	Strong Positive
Competition - Cost-Effectiveness/VFM	0.781	0.000	Very Strong Positive

Source: Author's Computation, 2026

The correlation coefficients are  $r = 0.685$  (Transparency) and  $r = 0.781$  (Competition). Both relationships are highly significant with a  $p$ -value of 0.000.

**Decision:** Since  $p < 0.05$  for both pairs, the null hypothesis ( $H_{03}$ ) is rejected.

**Interpretation:** The results establish a very strong, significant positive relationship between both Transparency and Competition principles of Due Process and the achievement of VFM. The stronger correlation for Competition ( $r = 0.781$ ) suggests that enforcing open bidding is the single most effective procedural tool used by the BPP to generate cost savings and ensure optimal resource utilization. This strongly validates the core economic rationale behind the Due Process reform (Aliu *et al.*, 2020).

## DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The key findings, based on the statistical analysis, are summarized as follows:

**Hypothesis One ( $H_{01}$ ):** The null hypothesis, which stated that the extent of compliance with due process procedures has no significant impact on the overall efficiency of public procurement, was rejected ( $p$ -value of 0.000). The analysis showed that Due Process explained 61.2% of the variation in overall efficiency, establishing a significant positive impact.

**Hypothesis Two ( $H_{02}$ ):** The null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant influence of due process compliance on the timely completion of public projects, was rejected ( $p$ -value of 0.015). The analysis revealed a significant negative influence ( $\beta = -0.198$ ), confirming that procedural rigour negatively impacts speed and contributes to project delays.



**Hypothesis Three (H<sub>03</sub>):** The null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant relationship between due process implementation (Transparency and Competition) and the achievement of Value for Money (VFM), was rejected (p-values of 0.000). The analysis demonstrated a very strong positive relationship between Competition ( $r = 0.781$ ) and Cost-Effectiveness/VFM.

The first set of findings (H<sub>01</sub> and H<sub>03</sub>) overwhelmingly confirms the success of Due Process in achieving its core fiscal and qualitative objectives. The rejection of H<sub>01</sub> validates the institutional reform: Due Process has a significant positive impact on overall procurement efficiency, driven primarily by gains in VFM and Quality ( $\bar{x}=4.35$  and  $\bar{x}=4.09$ , respectively). This aligns with the findings of the Ogun State study and the Lagos construction project study (Oladiran & Oche (2024); Ayangade *et al.*, 2013), which similarly reported that Due Process policy achieved core objectives like "Economy and Efficiency, Competition, Value for money and Transparency" and had a "very positive impact" on "cost savings" and "quality of project delivery". From the perspective of Agency Theory, the BPP successfully acts as the monitor, mitigating the agency problem by enforcing high standards of Compliance and Competition, which minimizes opportunistic behavior (corruption) and ensures the Principal (the Nigerian government) secures the optimal return on investment (McCue & Prier, 2008).

The most critical finding is the rejection of H<sub>02</sub>, which revealed a significant negative relationship between Due Process and Timeliness ( $\bar{x}=2.88$ ). This finding supports the critique found in the literature that the procedural rigor, while successful in ensuring probity, creates a bureaucratic bottleneck that slows down the public service delivery process (Dello & Yoshida, 2017). This outcome is a classic illustration of the dilemma presented by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). While the Due Process mechanism reduces ex-post transaction costs (corruption, contract failure), it significantly increases the ex-ante transaction costs (the time, documentation, and review effort required to secure a contract). For the BPP, the current implementation structure has not yet managed to optimize this trade-off, meaning that the security and accountability gained are achieved at the expense of speed. This underscores the challenges related to inadequate digital infrastructure and capacity gaps, which force over-reliance on slow manual review processes (Buhari *et al.*, 2022).

### Policy and Institutional Implications

The BPP's highest mean score for Competition ( $\bar{x}=4.34$ ) and its strongest correlation with VFM ( $r = 0.781$ ) suggest that future efficiency improvements should focus on preserving the principles of competition while drastically reducing the time required for the No Objection certification. The low score on timeliness further indicates that while the Due Process Policy itself is effective (institutional rule), the implementation capacity (institutional practice) is lagging, pointing to the need for accelerated and robust investment in e-procurement solutions and continuous capacity development for both BPP and MDA staff (Aliu *et al.*, 2020).

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings, the following conclusions are drawn regarding the operation and impact of the Due Process Mechanism at the Bureau of Public Procurement in Abuja: The study conclusively demonstrates that the implementation of the Public Procurement Act, 2007, through the Due Process Mechanism, has been highly successful in achieving its core fiscal and institutional objectives. The significant positive relationship between procedural compliance and overall efficiency, particularly its proxies of Cost-Effectiveness/VFM and Quality of Project Output ( $\bar{x}$  =4.35 and  $\bar{x}$  =4.09 respectively), affirms the BPP's role as a robust anti-corruption and quality-control institution. This conclusion is strongly supported by Agency Theory. The BPP, acting as the principal's monitor, effectively uses the rigorous Due Process protocols (Compliance and Competition) to align the interests of the Agents (Procuring Entities) with the public good. By enforcing competitive bidding, the BPP mitigates the information asymmetry that historically led to contract inflation and budget padding, thereby ensuring the government achieves optimal Value for Money (McCue & Prier, 2008). The success in enhancing quality further indicates that the pre-qualification and specification review processes are effective filters for competent contractors, leading to a reduction in the incidence of poor work quality and project abandonment (as suggested by the high-Quality mean score).

While the Due Process Mechanism has fostered financial prudence, the study concludes that it operates under a severe Timeliness Dilemma. The significant negative influence ( $\beta$  = -0.198) of Due Process on timely project delivery, coupled with the low mean score for Timeliness ( $\bar{x}$  = 2.88), confirms the persistent criticism that the mechanism creates bureaucratic bottlenecks, it is best interpreted through the lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The Due Process System is designed to reduce *ex-post* transaction costs (e.g., costs arising from corruption, contract failure, and rework) through intensive monitoring. However, the study confirms that the intensive documentation and multiple review stages necessary to obtain the Certificate of No Objection create high *ex-ante* transaction costs in the form of procedural delays and time overruns (Ugochukwu, 2018). This inefficiency poses a significant threat to the national economy, as delays in infrastructure projects often translate into higher final costs and delayed public service delivery. The BPP, therefore, faces an inherent structural challenge: the measures required for probity are currently antithetical to the goal of speed.

The research establishes that the Competition proxy of Due Process is the strongest determinant of Cost-Effectiveness/VFM ( $r=0.781$ ). This leads to the conclusion that the BPP's most valuable contribution to efficiency is its ability to enforce open and competitive bidding. This mechanism leverages market dynamics not just internal controls to drive down costs and secure better terms. The commitment to Transparency also plays a strong, supportive role, as public disclosure reduces uncertainty and attracts a wider pool of credible bidders, making the competition factor more potent. The core conclusion here is that the future optimization of the Due Process system should concentrate on accelerating the procedural checks without compromising the competitive integrity

of the tender process. The current system is effective, but it is too slow to support the pace of development required in Nigeria.

To build upon the findings of this study, the following areas are recommended for future academic inquiry:

1. **Comparative Study Across Tiers of Government:** A comparative analysis of Due Process implementation across the Federal (BPP), State, and Local Government levels should be undertaken to ascertain whether the VFM/Timeliness trade-off is consistent across all tiers of governance in Nigeria.
2. **Qualitative Analysis of Corruption Leakages:** A qualitative study using in-depth interviews with contractors, consultants, and procurement auditors could explore the specific mechanisms through which funds are still being diverted (leakages), despite the high compliance scores, providing a deeper understanding of the system's vulnerabilities.

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