

Coercive Diplomacy, Military Strategy and Foreign Policy Projections

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ABSTRACT: *In foreign policy projections, leaders consider options and make decision based principally on their strategic situation and evaluation of relative power. The means and methods open to states may include strategic planning which implies states decisions to employ armed forces impressively in their pursuit of national goals by exerting influence and making concealed inputs on the output of other states policies, all aimed at convincing the target state of one's political resolve and military capabilities. States without these capabilities are therefore in a dilemma. The aim of this paper is to place the relationship between coercive diplomacy, military strategy and foreign policy projections. The paper adopted the survey research design. The instrument for data collection was structured questionnaire while the simple linear regression analysis was used to examine the extent of the relationship that exist between the variables. The two hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance. Findings revealed that there is a significant relationship between the two independent variables of coercive diplomacy & military strategy and foreign policy projections, and that the possession of particular military technologies and weapons' systems influences the relative state with which a state can support its foreign policy projections. The paper therefore recommends that for any state to become an active and credible international actor, able to shape its close environment and contribute to global peace and security, it must develop the military capabilities and political will to back up its foreign policy by force when necessary.*

KEYWORDS: coercive, diplomacy, military, strategy, foreign policy

INTRODUCTION

.....Perhaps the classical and in numerous ways the most celebrated definitive statement of this interaction between the military instrument and policy objective is directly represented in the Clausewitzian aphorism that 'war is nothing than a perpetuation of politics by an admixture of other means: In order words from the position of Clausewitz, war is a purposive, functional thing

which states apply at a suitable moment in the pursuit of their own policy objectives... (cited in Bassey, 1998:6)

Foreign policies are generally designed to help protect a country's national interest, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can happen through peaceful cooperation with other states, aggression, war and or exploitation (Haukkala 2006). The means and approaches open to states may include strategic planning which suggests states decisions to employ armed forces notably in their quest for national goals by exerting influence and making hidden inputs on the output of other states policies.

It is a multifaceted and dynamic cause of action that a country follows in relation to other states policies on precise issues as well as obligations to certain positions on the current forms of interest and purposes ... in international relations and the means and techniques by which it pursues them (the Brookings institution 1975, 375, cited in Eminue, 2006). Foreign policy denotes the instrument upon which the interest caused by the national goals of the state are secured and advanced. The strategies for achieving these goals are said to be the basic determinants of foreign policy. A country's foreign policy is a component of political goals that seeks to show how that country will interrelate with other countries of the world. Therefore, 'brute force thrives when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most effective when held in reserve. It is the peril of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone to comply...' (Schelling, 1966:3).

Coercion involves using what Schelling opined as the 'diplomacy of violence' to affect the cost-benefit calculations of the opposition. In coercive strategies, diplomacy is supported by just enough force of suitable kind to demonstrate resolution and to give trustworthiness to the threat that superior force will be used if necessary' (George in Freedman, 1998: 20). The aim is to convince the target state of one's political resolve and military capabilities.

Even in deterrence strategy, important signaling, bargaining, and negotiating dimensions are built into the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Coercion involves the use of threat of force, or the limited use of force with the threat of further escalation, to change the decision making calculus of the target actor. Strategy, Hedley Bull claimed, is the art or science of influencing means so as to encourage ends in any given field of conduct' and involves ' using military force so as to accomplish given objects of policy'

In foreign policy projections, leaders consider options and make decision based principally on their strategic situation and a valuation of relative power. State autonomy vis-à-vis society, civil-military relations and organizational politics can obstruct the efficiency of statesmen responses to systemic necessities. For instance, state capability, implying the extractive capability of a state's central political institution, affects both the sum of military power a state can predict in its foreign policy and the space of its grand strategy (Desch 1996: 237-268).

In the strategic domain, and in the contemporary international order, the power of war and the capacity for armed coercion which it sustains play a veritable role in international politics. Consequently, it has become a standard to mention military power as one of the numerous techniques of statesmanship alongside diplomacy, propaganda, economic sanctions and subversion.

Statement of the Problem

In the pursuit of states foreign policies and to bolster their national goals, statesmen of different nations regulatory pursue incompatible objectives in the international arena. This conflict of interest differs in many ways. One state may have additional important interest at stake than the others and alleged greater issues in the conflict episode. The conducts in which statesmen pursue their goals also differ in some instances, a state may pursue its interest by bringing huge resources such as large military forces, partners, or restrictions on products vital to others to the support of the issue it supposed to be at stake.

Since 1945, there has been rareness of war involvement by countries considered to be major powers and specifically, the absence of war involvement between key powers themselves; in spite of the conflicts in which the USA and the USSR supported their allies, e.g. Korea, Vietnam, Angola, among others, they did not combat each other in a war. In several instances, force has been used more as a political tool or as raw military mechanism. This is known as coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of violence, example: Israeli strategy of harsh retaliations against Arab states hosting Palestinian raiders or civil war between nations which are legion (Bonchuks 2002). The issue at stake and the resources the state is able to bring to support its interest form the structure of a conflict. The issue at stake in a specific conflict of interest, and or the resources accessible for supporting these issues may be such that a state will choose to stand its grounds or if important, escalate its conflict activity in order to protect its interest. In circumstances where both states and parties to a conflict have similar preference, the structure of the conflict is then likening to the game theorist's concept of the prisoner's dilemma where no party to the conflict is ready to back down in respect to what it observed to be the central issue. An effort by one party to dare the other on this issue, will result to the other party standing its ground. The conflict episode will therefore persevere and probably worsen.

The aim of this work therefore is to showcase the place of coercive diplomacy and military strategy in the foreign policy projections of the States.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

‘...The capacity of states to protect themselves and their evident willingness to do so affords the basic structure within which the business of international negotiation is done...’
(Howard cited in Bassey 2005:21).

In the views of Mearsheimer, states must persistently worry about their survival because potential opponents may try to eliminate them at any time. He opined that “states function in both international political atmosphere and international economic environment, and the previous controls the latter in cases where the two come into conflict” (Mearsheimer 1992: 213). This suggests that states will greatly rely on military strategy and exert their capacity for armed coercion to back their foreign policies.

In the quest of foreign policy objectives, states adopt different approaches, one of which is military strategy. ... Whether considered in terms of its direct or indirect employment, military power has become in the contemporary era, the legally sanctioned tool of violent which states adopt in their relations with each other and when needed in an international security role (Bassey 2005:24).

Some statesmen calculate the expected utility before employing military strategy. These may entail the values or priorities the nation attaches to results that might stem from a war, or the willingness of the nation to take risks, and an approximation of key possibilities such as the prospect of winning an armed struggle against one or rivals, the probabilities of receiving assistance from other actors, and the probabilities of coming across opposition from state and non-states actors. War is therefore a prearranged strategy for political goals. Thus when emotions become involved in international violence, Freud argued, they predictably give way to unlimited and irrational applications of force. Freud opined that humans have a life and death instinct and culture should be molded to control destructive impulses (Freud, 1953). Human predisposition to violence, frustration, complex emotions of fear and anger rising from crisis moments, a high level of threat, limited time frame as in hijacking, involvement of the uppermost foreign policy establishment in the decision process during a crisis condition, are all war potentials.

The possession of specific military technologies and weapons’ systems impacts the relative state with which a state can support its foreign policy and threaten, or attack another in the quest for foreign policy. Military strategy may not essentially be applied against the utmost threat in the international system but in contrast to states that pose an instant threat to their foreign policies (Waltz 1987:21 and 262). Waltz further opined that the needs for survival often force states to forgo common beneficial cooperation. Cooperation becomes tough because states are sensitive to how it influences their current and future relative capabilities.

Thomas Christensen’s domestic mobilization theory explain the problem of how domestic politics restraints states’ abilities to adjust their foreign policies (Christensen 1996: 256). In the late 1940s and 1950s the U.S and Chinese leaders struggled to mobilize local resources to balance against the then USSR, but lacked adequate national political power to do so as they pleased. President Harry Truman and Mao Zedong used internally popular but unnecessary foreign policies in secondary areas as a deviation for necessary, but unpopular policies in key areas. These secondary policies

set in motion a chain of events culminating in the U.S subsequent Chinese interventions in the Korean war (1996, 32).

Considering the grand strategies of the superpowers during the cold war, Freiberg argues that while the capacity for armed coercion push the U.S and the then USSR toward confrontation in pursuit of their foreign policies, internal features shaped the types of strategies each side embraced. In the case of the U.S, a mixture of weak states institutions, the material interests of several societal actors, and embedded antistatic ideology ultimately led to the pursuit of a flexible response strategy and a limited program of power creation. The former USSR on the other had lacked all of the countervailing domestic influences. As a result, during most of the cold war, the USSR pursued a more ambitious military doctrine, full war fighting, than the U.S and undertook a far expansive program of power creation (Friedberg 2000: 66 and 75).

Citing the case of Western Europe, Duchene wrote that ‘...Europe would be the first major areas of the old world where the age old process of war and direct violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth century citizen’s notion of civilized politics where its relative lack of military compatibilities would not be a problem’ (Duchene, 1972: 43). The civilian power concept was subsequently developed by Hans Maul and applied to West Germany and Japan (Maul 1990, 2000) Maul drew heavily on Nye’s concepts of soft (or persuasive) power (Nye 1990), positing that civilian power was dedicated to multilateral co-operation, institution - building and supranational integration rather than unilateralism, national pride and the unrestrained defense of sovereignty.

They sought to ‘civilianized’ international relations by pressuring the use of military force and consolidating the rule of law, the peaceful resolve of conflict and human rights. The concept of civilian power has been broadly applied to the EU/ the EC as international players (Hill 1990). These opinions all reflect an influential line of reasoning rooted as Hedley Bull (1981) posited in the idealist and progressivist explanations of international relations of the 1920s. For Bull, the opinion of Duchene, Nye, Keohane, and others, who emphasized element such as the declining utility of military forces as a currency of power, the essentiality of civilian power, the shortfalls of the state-centric paradigm and the power ideals, instituted the neo-progressive or the neo idealist method of the 1970s. The approach has enjoyed a renewed lease of life with the end of the cold war.

The challenge with the civilian power concept is that it overlooks the strategic and geo-political context in which the European integration process developed. At the time Duchene wrote, Western Europe was sealed into a bipolar confrontation with the USSR and its associates, and depend on NATO and the U.S nuclear and conventional forces for its security. France and the UK also possessed their own nuclear weapons, and most Western Europe countries based their defense around man conscript armies. What was then still call the EEC could only be a civilian power

because of NATO and the US security guarantee. Frankly speaking, the EC was a model case of a free rider profiting from security provided by others. As noted by Bull, the civilian power concept was a contradiction in terms because the power of influence exerted by EC and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a planned environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not regulate. Europe, he concluded is not an actor in international matters and does not seem probably to become one (Bull 1981: 151).

In the early 1970s, opined that inter dependence had led to low politics substituting military concerns at the top of the international agenda underpinned opinions that the militarily feeble and politically divided countries of Western Europe established a great civilian power. The openness of this claim was deceptive from their behaviour after the 1973-74 oil crises. Not Western as any kind of power, but the distinct states of Western Europe, answered to the crisis by behaving at once alike Hens and Ostriches (Waltz 1979:152).

Recently, the EU has developed in methods that cast doubt on the explanatory utility of self power' on the basis of theories such as civilian and normative power. Such theories have become increasingly marginal to the current debate on security and defense cooperation. It is beginning to emerge as a strategic actor in its own right with both hard and soft power capabilities and is also acquiring the status of an actor in the sense of the capability not just to define its strategic interest, but to chase them in policy initiative.

Structural realism would also submit that whatever its original features may be, the weight of the international system will lead it over time to secure the attributes and capabilities of other states actors, in particular, a capability for exercising coercive military power. Since the theory portrays international politics as a competitive system, Waltz claims, one predicts more specifically that states will show characteristics common to competitors. (1979:128) such as employing the capacity for armed coercion in the quest for their foreign policies.

In any conflict condition, the strategic purpose is to break the enemy's will to resist. There are many ways in which this can be achieved, but the classic distinction is that drawn by Thomas Schelling between what he termed 'brute force' and 'coercion' Brute force involves using military power in an all-out assault to destroy the target's military assets in order to remove his power to resist and impose one's will upon him. Coercion, on the other hand, comprises the threat of force and, if that is inadequate, the actual use of restricted force with the threat of more to come. The crucial point to note is that with coercion, in contrast to strategies employing brute force, the target retains an element of free choice.

The distinguishing feature of coercion, as Lawrence Freedman points out, is that, the target is never denied choice, but must weight the choices between the cost of compliance and of non-compliance (1998:36). The perfection of strategy, offers the prospect of achieving foreign policy goals without

serious fighting or undue cost in blood or coin, yet coercive strategies are notoriously difficult to devise and implement, and the historical records is not particularly promising.

Four problems in particular stand out: Coercion denotes a spectrum of military force from threats to the real use of force. It can be seen as a form of “limited war”, particularly in its emphasis on politics, diplomacy and psychological factors (Kissinger 1957). The problem here is that military force is a notoriously blunt instrument, which is more like a sledgehammer than a scalpel. Using force discriminately and efficiently is challenging, military strategy in crisis management circumstances must be framed with a view not just to winning, but building a post-conflict peace order. At the same time, the condition for political direction and control of the conflict must not lead to micro-management of the battlefield: a balance must be found between political responsibility and military effectiveness.

Coercive strategies seek to transform the decision-making calculus of the adversary, not to institute control through a decisive military victory and the conquest of the enemy. The target always preserves an element of choice. Such a strategy opined that interests are not zero-sum and unequal, but that there is some shared ground, and that negotiation is possible. In a sense therefore, it opined some underling agreement about the nature of the conflict, which might not be the case with rogue states or warlords in a failed state.

Framing a coercive strategy is also difficult because one must consider both the balance of interests involved and the strength of motivation, in other words, not just what interests each side has, but how strongly they feel about them. It thus involves understanding the identity and fundamental value of the two adversaries; how they construct and interpret reality; and the “bounded rationality” within which they operate. Moreover, interests can change in the course of a conflict as positions harden and negotiating positions become less flexible. The key to the successful use of calculated coercion is to identify the suitable “coercive mechanisms” i. e the vulnerabilities and pressure points of the opposition. Once the target’s center of gravity has been identified, force can be used discriminately and effectively.

This is the root of the problem, but correctly identifying the coercive mechanism, is tremendously difficult. In all, coercion is not a science and surely does not involve the application of mechanical formula and sensible calculation. Rather, it is an art, containing the creative use of resources and skilled bargaining-what Clausewitz considered as creativity and genius.

Coercion, to paraphrase Clausewitz, is the furtherance of politics by other means; it includes using the skills and instruments of diplomacy and joining them with the threat of force. The problems here are multiple. It is difficult to combine carrots and sticks because of the mixed signals this can send: carrots can denote a lack of resolve and a propensity for appeasement, while sticks can mean that the coercer has extra far-reaching and aggressive intentions.

Coercion also involves complex games played at two or more levels: coercers need to convince domestic public opinion of the justness and urgency of their cause, they must build and maintain accord at the international level between partners, and they must communicate clear messages to the adversary. Coercive strategies are often implemented in multi-actor environments, above all, crisis management involving coercive diplomacy; like all strategic interaction, proceeds with a non-linear, paradoxical logic, unlike domestic conflicts which are constrained and patterned by law and custom. Escalation is an ever present peril, and thus as Hill (1990:143) opined, coercive diplomacy involves a gamble on big loses and big returns.

The lesson from the Balkans, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia was that diplomacy and moral posturing. - The key instruments of civilian power were on their own hardly effective to reverse aggression. The common theme in this failure was the inability of governments to back principle with decisive military force. Reflecting on the Balkan wars, Carl Bildt, among others, opined that military force is sometimes vital in order to backup diplomatic advantage. Force, he argued should not be a substitute for diplomacy but under the factual conditions it can give strength to the quest for political solutions represented by diplomacy. The former U.N secretary Kofi Annan argued; in the context of their Kosovo war, that there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of (foreign policy) peace. By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that the EU had learnt the hard way of enduring relevance of Machiavelli's allegory of the centaur, half beast and half man. Machiavelli believed that the basis of any political order was good laws and good - arms a judicious mix of authority and force, coercion and consent, power and hegemony. Certainly, he believed that upright arms were inescapable precondition for good laws and that where there are good arms, good laws certainly follow. Machiavelli therefore believed that political leaders needed to learn both how to act in the context of a stable environment governed by the rule of law and settled institutions, and in a circumstance of anarchy when the laws of the jungle are adopted.

...you should apprehend, therefore, that there are two methods of fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to man, and the second to beasts. But as the first way often proves inadequate, one must need have recourse to the second, so the Prince must understand how to make a nice use of the beast and the man... a Prince must know how to act according to the nature of both, as he cannot survive otherwise (Machiavelli, 1962; 235).

Statement of Hypotheses

The hypotheses upon which this research is premised are cast in the null forms:

Hypothesis 1:

Ho: There is no significant relationship between the possession of superior military technologies and the relative influence states have in their foreign policy projections.

Hi: There is significant relationship between the possession of superior military technologies and the relative influence states have in their foreign policy projections.

Hypothesis 2:

Ho: There is no significant relationship between States capacity to apply coercive diplomacy and the relative influence on their foreign policy projections.

Hi: There is significant relationship between States capacity to apply coercive diplomacy and the relative influence on their foreign policy projections.

METHODOLOGY

The work adopted the Survey research design. The survey design allows information to be gathered from a sample of people or organizations by the use of questionnaire. The main source of data for this study was primary data. Simple linear regression analysis was used to examine the extent of the relationship that exist between the predictor variables and the criterion variable. The two hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance.

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.

A total of two hundred and ninety six (296) copies of questionnaire were distributed and two hundred and eighty-one (281) was retrieved of which two hundred and seventy-seven (277) copies were found useable. This gives a response rate of 95.8 percent. Only 94 percent of the administered questionnaire was found useable. The responses were coded and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 23.0) was used to run data analysis.

Test of Hypotheses

In presenting the results of this study, each hypothesis was first restated in the null form. This was closely followed by identification of the major variables and the test analytical technique employed before the interpretation of results all at 0.05 level of significance.

Hypothesis 1

H₀₁: There is significant relationship between the possession of superior military technologies and the relative influence states have in their foreign policy projections.

Table 1: Summary of Simple Regression Analysis Showing Relationship between possession of superior military technologies and the relative influence states have in their foreign policy projections

	B ₁	SE	B ₂	t-value	Significant (2 tailed)
Constant	10.277	0.939		10.943	0.000
Superior military technologies	0.423	0.61	0.392	6.968*	0.000
Dependent variable: Foreign policy projections					
R = 0.392 ^a					
R ² = 0.154					
Adjusted R-square = 0.154					
Std. Error of estimate = 2.47068					
F = 48.560					
Significance = 0.000					

**significantly related at 5% (p<0.05). B₁= unstandardized beta, B₂= standardized beta, SE= standard error.*

Results from Table 1 show the coefficient of determination at R² of 0.154. This means that the independent variable (Superior military technologies) accounted for 15.4% of the variation in foreign policy projections. In addition, the significant F-ratio at F = 48.560, p < 0.000 suggest that the results of the regression model could not have occurred by chance and that the independent variables significantly predicted the dependent variable. To assess the importance of the independent variable in determining the degree of change in the dependent variable, the beta coefficients for the variable; Superior military technologies had a statistically significant standardized coefficient of ($\beta = 0.423$, S.E = 0.61, t calc = 6.968, p = 0.000 p < 0.05) showing a significant influence on foreign policy projections. This finding can be interpreted that every 1-unit change in possession of superior military technologies will lead to a 0.423 change in foreign policy projections. Since the p-value is less than 0.05(p=0.000<0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between possession of Superior military technologies and foreign policy projections.

Hypothesis 2

H₀₂: There is no significant relationship between States capacity to apply coercive diplomacy and the relative influence on their foreign policy projections.

Table 2: Summary of Simple Regression Showing Relationship between States Capacity to Apply Coercive Diplomacy and the Relative Influence on Their Foreign Policy Projections.

	B ₁	SE	B ₂	t-value	Significant (2 tailed)
Constant	9.774	0.728	-	13.433	0.000
States capacity	0.463	0.048	0.512	9.751*	0.000
Dependent variable: foreign policy projections					
R = 0.512 ^a					
R ² = 0.263					
Adjusted R-square = 0.260					
Std. Error of estimate = 2.30648					
F = 95.090					
Significance = 0.000					

**significantly related at 5% (p < 0.05). B₁ = unstandardized beta, B₂ = standardized beta, SE = standard error.*

Table 2 reveals that $R^2 = 0.263$, which means that the independent variable (States capacity) accounted for 26.3% of the variation in foreign policy projections. In addition, the significant F-ratio at $F = 95.090$, $p < 0.000$ suggest that the results of the simple regression analysis could not have occurred by chance and that the independent variables significantly predicted the dependent variable. To ascertain the essentiality of the independent variable in determining the degree of change in the dependent variable, the beta coefficients for the variable; States capacity had statistically significant standardized coefficient of $\beta = 0.463$, $S.E = 0.048$, $t = 9.751$, $p = 0.000$ $p < 0.05$, showing significant influence on foreign policy projections. This finding can be interpreted that every 1-unit change in ambient condition will lead to a 0.463 change in foreign policy projections. Since the p-value is less than 0.05 ($p = 0.000 < 0.05$), the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between States capacity to apply coercive diplomacy and foreign policy projections.

Thus, the gross distribution of power and the relative share of the international system's material capabilities that each state controls affect the capabilities that individual states carry out particular diplomatic and military strategies. This in turn influence the severity of the security dilemma between particular states or regional subsystems.

When diplomacy breaks down or appears to promise little, states today, as in the former, at times resort to the use of armed forces in their relations as a strategy to implement their interest. Force can be utilized to seize goals or to apply enough pressure to influence an adversary to negotiate. Hostilities may continue while the war is on in order to induce concessions and adopt acceptable terms of settlement. Thus, cost benefit analysis or rational calculations highlight decisions and that war is a thoughtful, conscious policy planned to achieve political aims. State men chase goals and strategies meant to obtain a portion of territory, complex, as in trying to re-create an enemy's entire

political system or to change the world balance of power. War could be grounded on simple or limited objectives and restrained to geographically narrow limits

An alternative structure occur when a party does not notice sufficiently important interest to be at stake in a conflict or does not have the resources appropriate for this particular instance and so prefers to acquiesce in the face of an adversary who appears willing to escalate the conflict. This acquiescence is akin to the 'chicken game' theory where a party with a chicken preference will give grounds before an adversary who appears to be committed to winning its way on the issue field. These conflicts structures are always present in the relations between states, thus, an important variable for statesmen in the accurate identification of the structure underlying any particular conflict of interest. Incorrect identification of the structure of conflict of the interest could result to grave consequences because each structure calls for a diverse strategy. Just as statesmen have hitches identifying the structures of a particular conflict, they also have challenges in applying the strategies suitable for these structures. However, strategy fuses with the conduct of states actions abroad implying foreign policy.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The power to hurt can be enlisted among the most impressive characteristics of military force. Hurting... is not unconcerned with the interest of others. It is measured in the suffering it can generate, and the victims' impulse to void it. Forcible action will work against weeds or floods as well as against armies but suffering requires a victim that can feel pain or has something to loss... it can only make people behave to avoid it. The only purpose... must be to influence someone behavior, to coerce his choice. To be coercive, violence has to be projected and (only) avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it, is diplomacy- brutal diplomacy, but diplomacy (schelling, 1966:2)

Utilizing the capacity for armed coercion (war) to support foreign policy, in Clausewitzian's view is a rational, national instrument of policy. The events of the Balkans in the early 1990s, in conjunction with the Iraqi invasions of Kuwait and the problems of failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan, demonstrated that although Europe's heartlands might enjoy a more peaceful and benign security environment, the world remained a dangerous and threatening place and international peace and security remained threatened by a mix of old and new security issues.

Drawing from the EU's aspiration as a regional hegemon, it has pursued milieu goals with the goal of reshaping European order in ways beneficial to the security and prosperity of its members. It has done so by wielding a mix of stiff and lenient power. Its hard power resources have primarily been based on economic carrots and stick. Linked to politically determined conditionality clauses. The not- inconsiderable instruments of economic statecraft available have provided a set of coercive instruments, which constitute the mailed first within the velvet glove of diplomacy. In the

immediate wake of the end of the cold war, there was a widespread feeling that the pattern of the international relations has changed and that military coercion has been meaningfully devalued as a currency of power. Such sentiments spurred the revival of the neo-idealist and neo-progressivist fashion recognized earlier by Bull, and led some policy makers to settle that soft power supported by the skillful exercise of economic statecraft would suffice for justice and liberty to triumph. It was illusion such as these in the effectiveness of civilian power that led to the misfortune of the Balkans. In 1990, the foreign minister of Luxemburg and then acting president of the EU council- Jacques Poos, majestically announced-‘this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans...if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it’s the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans and not up to anybody else.’ (Quoted in White, 2001:108). This was however followed by force, and then by tragedy as ‘Europe’ in the shape of the EU failed to stop the lineage into violence and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. In the end, it was hard-nosed U.S. diplomacy, NATO bombs and Anglo - French military action that brought an end to the sequence of bloodshed in Bosnia and later Kosovo. The wars of Yugoslav succession demonstrated all too starkly the limits of civilian power. The major lesson of the Balkans was that if the EU wanted to be credible and effective international actor, it needed to be able to backup its diplomacy with military coercion.

The central theme running all through this paper is that for any state to become an active and credible international actor, able to shape its close environment and contribute to global peace and security, it must improve the military capabilities and political will to backup its foreign policy by force when necessary. Advocates of civilian power without armed coercion have argued that security today even for the super powers; consist in shaping the international milieu often in areas which at first sight have little to do with security.

...The historical as well as modern prevalence of inter and intra- national wars and military coalitions have sustained the view that until the nation state system is drastically transformed and superseded by a diverse international order, the military power and the capacity for armed coercion which it sustains, is probably to continue to play a momentous role in international politics (Bassegy, 2005: 22)

Strategic thought is never separated from political thought, state must recognize that if they are to act as a civilian power, they need to add coercive military power to their foreign and security policy instruments. The finish armed forces in the world and the most effective crisis decision- making may be useless if a state fail to develop a common strategic culture and military doctrines. States that intend to become serious players in the international system must be decisive on how to use military force in support of foreign policy.

Coercion is a very tough strategy to implement as it is replete with risks and doubts. There is an ever present risk of escalation in the context of a changing and dynamic environment. Once force

or the threat of force is introduced into a crisis situation, the whole dynamics of the conflict change. States have no option but to try to develop the capacities and political will to make nice use of the beast and the man, if they desire to be ethical powers that can both defend their citizens and save visitors, they must be able to back up their diplomacy with military force and thus vigorously shape international system.

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