

Public Policy, Political will, and illegal employment in Cameroon: Trends in Yaoundé's Public service practices

Ernest Messina Mvogo
messinaernest9@gmail.com

doi : <https://doi.org/10.37745/gjpsa.2013/vol13n2111>

Published: May 06, 2025

Citation: Mvogo E.M. (2025) Public Policy, Political will, and illegal employment in Cameroon: Trends in Yaoundé's Public service practices, *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*, Vol.13, No.2, pp.1-11

Abstract: *The precarious nature of employment in Cameroon is an undeniable reality, as evidence the high-rate unemployment rate and the growing prominence of the informal sector in the country's labor market. Experts often attribute this situation primarily to poor governance. The causal relationship between public policies and employment precariousness is frequently viewed holistically, sometimes leading to a fragmented and simplistic understanding of the issue. This study aims, through an empirical-descriptive approach, to highlight the discrepancies between public employment policies, political will, and youth employment precariousness in Cameroon's capital since 1960. Based on primary sources, including oral testimonies and information from written documents – mainly scientific journal, articles and press releases – this reflection concludes that the illegal employment many youths engage in within Yaoundé benefits from the tacit support of public authorities. Their apparent powerlessness regarding this unethical practice unfortunately tends to formalize the informal (the illegal) in Cameroon's labor market in general, and in Yaoundé in particular.*

Keywords: Public policies, political will, precariousness, illegal employment, Cameroon

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the conceptual triptych of public policy, political will, and illegal employment to analyze the relationship between public authorities and youth employment in Cameroon, particularly in Yaoundé. Employment is commonly defined as engaging in a profession within a remunerated activity, compensated through wages, salaries, or fees. Illegal employment, also referred to as illicit work or undeclared labor, pertains to any remunerated activity that evades fiscal and social obligations mandated by law. The concept of public policy is multifaceted; however, the political interpretation provided by Madeleine Grawitz, Jean Leca, and Jean-Claude Thoenig (1985) aligns with our study. These scholars consider public policies

as "the interventions of an authority endowed with public power and governmental legitimacy over a specific domain of society or territory."¹ Public policy is intrinsically linked to political will, which can be understood as the manifestation of the former. In other words, political will denotes the commitment of public authorities to make decisions aimed at implementing public policies to serve the general interest of the society they oversee.

The issue of youth employment remains a global concern, despite the reassuring forecasted by accredited organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), which projects a youth unemployment rate of 12.8% in 2024 and 2025, a decrease of 0.8 points compared to 2023. In 2023, the number of unemployed youth worldwide was 64.9 million². In Africa, in particular, the youth population is increasing, and access to decent jobs continues to be problematic. Cameroon, like most countries of the continent, is not exempt from this reality. According to official figures, the broad unemployment rate was 13%, while the underemployment rate raised at 70% in 2014³. In 2023, the unemployment rate among the active population aged 15-24 was estimated at 6.6% according to the World Bank. Since gaining international sovereignty, the Cameroonian state has endeavored to provide solutions through various employment policies such as PAJER-U and PIAASI. However, these figures mask the reality of a labor market dominated by urban youth unemployment and job insecurity⁴. It is therefore legitimate to question the effectiveness of public policies directed at the youth by the Cameroonian state. Does this situation not result from a lack of harmony between public policies and political will? What are the manifestations of youth unemployment in Yaoundé, and what are their consequences?

Dynamics of Public employment policies in Cameroon since the end of colonization

At the time of independence, Cameroon, like most post-colonial states, faced multiple challenges, including employment. Public policies in this domain were shaped by the welfare state model. However, the state's inability to fully assume its sovereign responsibilities led, in the early 1980s, to a paradigm shift – from a decision-making and interventionist state to a regulatory role in economic affairs. This apparent evolution in public policies has had a direct correlation with fluctuations in youth employability in Cameroon.

The Welfare State and the absence of Youth employment policies: 1960–Late 1990s

Between 1960 and the early 1990s, Cameroon adopted a welfare state socio-economic policy, in which the state controlled all markets, including the labor market. In essence, Cameroon's development was based on a model of planned liberalism, which later evolved into communal liberalism. President Ahmadou Ahidjo defined planned liberalism as a system in which "the state, while encouraging private initiative, assumes primary responsibility for defining,

¹ Madeleine Grawitz, Jean Leca et Jean-Claude Thoenig, *Traité de Science politique*, Paris, PUF, 1985.

² « Le taux de chômage des jeunes au plus bas depuis 15 ans dans le monde », www.ungeneva.org, Accessed, 09/03/2025.

³ According to the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper.

⁴ The unemployment rate in Cameroon was estimated at 11.4% for men and 16.8% for women.

directing, stimulating, and controlling national development⁵. "This philosophy aimed to promote a system where individual enterprises operated within a collective framework, striking a balance between individual effort and state support. Given the socio-political context of the time, this approach appeared appropriate. From a politico-administrative perspective, while some institutional structures existed, they remained insufficient in terms of human capital. As a result, the government's primary objective was to foster endogenous development, as Cameroon was still a nation under construction, with the state bearing the principal responsibility.

Moreover, the number of trained nationals was inadequate, making it risky to fully open the country to private initiatives. This extensive state intervention was largely accepted, particularly as it led to significant improvements in living conditions within a stable environment. According to President Ahmadou Ahidjo, the primary justification for this approach was,

Let the unemployed youth, especially those in urban areas, be convinced of the dignity of agricultural work, which is the source of all wealth and civilization. Let them recognize that agriculture, like all other sectors of national activity, when practiced with dedication, diligence, and efficiency, can provide significant personal satisfaction and serve as a reliable pathway to social advancement⁶.

Following Independence, the Cameroon government did not have a specific youth employment policy. While the various five-year plans implemented by the state since 1960 and the large-scale recruitment in the civil service as well as public enterprises reflected on the awareness of the need for youth employment and the reduction of unemployment within this demographic, one could not speak of a specific youth employment policy. For rural youth prone to rural exodus, the state initiated a policy – albeit partial due to its targeted and local nature – designed to help young people from rural areas find remunerative work. Thus, moving from rhetoric to implementation, several rural development projects, notably the creation of pioneer villages, were launched. One of the flagships of this program was undoubtedly the Yabassi-Bafang operation in 1968, which promoted the development of underutilized land through internal migration. Thanks to this project, many young people from the Western Province of Cameroon, mostly from the neighboring town of Bafang, relocated to the villages in the Nkam department. The Cameroonian authorities also supported this policy by deciding to create rural hospitals and implement rural education. Certain localities were equipped with institutions for vocational education and training to prepare young people for direct employment.

The Regulatory state and employment policies: Mid-1990s to the present

By the late 1980s, due to the economic crisis, the Cameroonian state was forced to implement structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF. Among the demands of this international

⁵ Ahmadou Ahidjo, *Recueil des discours d'Ahmadou Ahidjo 1968-1973*, 3^e édition, ACAP n° 284 du 16/12/1972, Yaoundé, p.351.

⁶ Ahmadou Ahidjo, *Recueil des discours d'Ahmadou Ahidjo 1968-1973*, 3^e édition, ACAP n° 78 du 5/4/1971, Yaoundé, p.253.

organization was the promotion of free enterprise, which culminated by the late 1990s, a period during which the thesis of the state's failure was both confirmed and consummated. This could be attributed to the structure of the politico-bureaucratic system and the rise of the regulatory state within the new context of globalization.⁷

Nevertheless, the state remained present in the economy, albeit in a different role; it no longer acted as the primary actor⁸ but as the arbiter of economic activity. Its role in regulating this activity led to a modification of its architecture, materialized through the establishment of regulatory agencies. The end of the state's monopoly in economic and social regulation was reflected in the establishment of new rules and regulatory bodies in sectors such as telecommunications, energy, and markets by the late 1990s. Essentially, this shift in public policy paradigms indicates innovation, although this innovation was affected by the existing forms upon which it was superimposed⁹. As an example of this new paradigm, the state was called upon not only to privatize more in the public sector but also to streamline the public service workforce, which international donors deemed excessive. The painful policy of downsizing that followed led to a drastic reduction in civil service numbers, from approximately 190,000 to 150,000, and a reduction in the wage bill.

In the early 2000s, the Cameroonian government demonstrated greater visibility in its employment policies for youth by creating two technical ministries dedicated to youth: the Ministry of Youth and Civic Education and the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training. The first ministry established the PAJER-U program¹⁰, tasked with supporting unschooled and school drop-out youth through technical and financial guidance to help them become small entrepreneurs. The second ministry implemented the PIAASI¹¹ program, which stems from the Cameroonian state's desire to actualize a policy for the viability of youth activities in the informal sector. Its main mission is to provide financial support to Cameroonian youth entrepreneurs in executing their projects, aiming both to fight against unemployment and to contribute to the transition from the informal to the formal sector. The various contexts in which the absence or experimentation of employment policies have occurred lead us to question the faces of youth professional integration in the city of Yaoundé.

Youth Employment in Yaoundé: Faces and Changes

The population of the city of Yaoundé has experienced exponential demographic growth since 1960, the year Cameroon gained international sovereignty. For example, all future growth rate estimates were largely caught off guard. In 1969, the population, which was 89,969 in 1962,

⁷ Gronnegard Christensen, J., 1998, « Le désengagement de l'État : étude critique d'un problème administratif dans son contexte politique », *Revue internationale des sciences administratives*, 54 (1) 1998 : 45-76.

⁸ The State remains an economic actor but not the most important; not all public enterprises had been privatized

⁹ Auguste Nguelietou, « L'évolution de l'action publique au Cameroun : l'émergence de l'État régulateur », www.polis.scinecespobordeaux.fr pdf, p.6.

¹⁰ Programme d'Appui à la Jeunesse Rurale et Urbaine

¹¹ PIAASI refers to the Support Program for Informal Sector Actors.

grew to 484,000 in 1983 and 793,000 in 1993¹². The youth population has not escaped this exponential demographic dynamic. With an unemployment rate of over 40% for those aged 20-24 in 1993, and with this trend not declining over time, this represents a key indicator of the difficulty young people face in entering the labor market.

Evolution of the labor market in Yaoundé from 1960 to 2008

Cameroon's population is estimated at 28,942,103 in 2023¹³, with 36.28% of the population aged 15 to 35 years old (3rd RGPH, 2005). The majority of active youth work in the informal sector, representing 90.5%. Overall, the unemployment rate decreased from 6.2% in 2005 to 5.7% in 2010, with 9.9% and 8.9% for young people aged 15 to 34 years, respectively¹⁴. However, this unemployment rate masks underemployment, which was 75.8% in 2005 and 70.6% in 2010, with 78.9% and 73.1% for youth, respectively. Recent data from 2022 suggests no bright future ahead. According to Perspective Monde, the unemployment rate for young people aged 15 to 24 stands at 6.61%¹⁵.

From 1960 until the mid-1990s, the dynamics of the labor market in Yaoundé were characterized by a dual movement: the growth in the supply of labor from households both in terms of volume and "quality of the workforce," and the regression of labor demand, specifically the demand for formal labor, which stagnated or even declined in certain sectors. These two divergent trends inevitably caused imbalances and tensions in the labor market¹⁶. Before the economic crisis of the 1980s, the public and semi-public sectors were the primary sources of employment. Competitions and recruitments organized by the state were the main means of entry into the job market, and furthermore, a higher level of education guaranteed stable employment. Thus, in 1992, of every ten young people aged 14 to 29 entering the labor market, three were unemployed, six entered the informal sector, and only one joined the formal sector (public or private)¹⁷. In the early 1990s, urban unemployment in Cameroon was considered one of the highest in Africa, far exceeding those in Latin America or Asia.¹⁸

However, since the 2000s, the labor market in Yaoundé has shown a different face. According to the 2005 survey on the Dynamics of Professional Integration of Youth in Yaoundé (EJID), professional integration primarily concerns first-time job seekers, who represent 79.7% of non-integrated youth, compared to 20.3% who had previously lost their jobs. The average age of

¹² For more information, read Roubaud François In « Le marché du travail à Yaoundé, 1983-1993. La décennie perdue », in *Tiers-Monde*, tome 35, n°140, 1994. pp. 751-778 http://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_1994, p.752.

¹³The total population in Cameroon was estimated at 28.6 million people in 2023, according to the latest census data and projections of Trading Economics <https://fr.tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/population>, accessed 03/08/2025.

¹⁴ Main Reports EESI 1 and EESI 2, INS

¹⁵ <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays>, accessed 29/04/2024

¹⁶ Roubaud François, *op cit.*

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ J-P Lachaud, « L'ajustement structurel et le marché du travail en Afrique francophone », *IIES*, DP, n°56/1993, Genève, 1993, Roubeau, « Où est le marché ? », *Cahier des sciences humaines*, n°30, 1994, Paris, ORSTOM.

first-time job seekers is over 24 years. Most of their training is in general education. Half of these youth have completed general secondary education, and 17% have a general higher education level, compared to only 4% of youth who have received technical higher education.¹⁹ This makes their professional integration even more difficult. The sectors where the most youths are employed in Yaoundé are commerce (45.6%), hospitality and catering (10.3%), transportation (9.7%), and livestock, fishing, and hunting (9.3%). Commerce, particularly small-scale commerce, is mainly found in the informal sector. Furthermore, youth face social security issues, particularly in terms of protected and unprotected employment²⁰. Except for the public and semi-public sectors, the rights to family allowances for young people are violated. In the formal private sector, only 20% of young people reported receiving family allowances, while more than 93% in the informal sector do not benefit from them.²¹

The State and the formalization of the informal Sector: what impact on youth unemployment?

The informal sector encompasses activities conducted by individual or family-run businesses in areas such as crafts, small commerce, manufacturing of various goods, and small services. This sector also includes salaried jobs without guaranteed contracts, employment benefits, or legal and social protection²². In Cameroon, nearly nine out of ten workers are employed in the informal sector, with around six engaged in agricultural activities. In contrast, the formal sector accounts for only 12.7% of the total employed population²³. This sector is predominantly occupied by men, while women are more likely to work in the informal agricultural sector. Overall, informal sector workers earn less than their counterparts in the formal sector. In 2005, the average monthly income in the informal sector was 29,600 CFA francs.²⁴

To fulfill its mission, the PIAASI teams regularly conduct field visits to evaluate and monitor the implementation of various micro-projects.²⁵ According to the 2017 report, the Cameroonian authorities claim that the program contributed to the training of 465 master artisans in various trades, 13,915 actors, financed 12,651 micro-projects, and created 50,000 jobs²⁶. However, despite these promising results, the program has been criticized by NGOs for its inefficiency due to a lack of transparency. PIAASI officials have been accused of failing to release beneficiary lists, allocated amounts, and monthly reports. As a result, the actions of this structure have had no real impact on fight against poverty and/or unemployment. The allocated funds are either misappropriated or invested in fictitious projects. When questioned about the effectiveness of government-led youth unemployment programs, 84% of respondents expressed

¹⁹ Patrick Félicien Mambou, « Stratégie d'insertion des jeunes de la ville de Yaoundé », Mémoire du diplôme d'ingénieur statisticien et économique, ISSEA, Yaoundé, 2006.

²⁰ Ibid. p.37.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Rapport national sur l'état de la population du Cameroun*, 2011, p.52.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The main eligibility criteria for this project are: being at least 18 years old and not more than 40 years old; being of Cameroonian nationality; having exploitation rights on land; presenting a viable microproject.

²⁶ Patrick Félicien Mambou, « Stratégie d'insertion des jeunes de la ville de Yaoundé », Mémoire du diplôme d'ingénieur statisticien et économique, ISSEA, Yaoundé, 2006.

dissatisfaction²⁷. In addition to PIAASI, other projects dedicated to youth are undermined by corruption, favoritism, and tribalism, leading to funding being granted on subjective bases. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the policy to formalize the informal sector, particularly in light of the observed trend towards illicit employment among youths

Persistent employment policies and the drift of youth towards Illegal employment

The deterioration of the youth labor market in Cameroon, particularly in the city of Yaoundé, explains the high unemployment rate and the increase in illegal jobs. Does the extent of this practice and the strategic nature of the locations where these activities are carried out not indicate a certain complicity from the administrative authorities?

Unemployment and the increase in “Financial Crime”

Unemployment is one of the greatest challenges faced by the Cameroonian government, particularly among the youth. Viewed from a broad perspective, this issue can be attributed to economic factors (lack of opportunities and poverty), social factors (social injustice), and political factors (environmental and political instability). Despite the various measures taken by the state and especially the increasing trend toward entrepreneurship among young Cameroonians (start-ups, e-commerce, etc.), unemployment remains a concerning plague in Cameroon, affecting both youth and adults. The depiction above, based on statements from a parliamentarian and data from the National Institute of Statistics (INS), clearly illustrates this situation.

74% is the unemployment rate reported in Cameroon for 2024, according to the figure revealed on November 13, 2024, by Gabriel Fandja, President of the Education Commission at the National Assembly. The parliamentarian does not delve into the various breakdowns of this indicator, but according to recent reports from the National Institute of Statistics (INS), this high unemployment rate is particularly noticeable among young people aged between 25 and 35 years with higher education qualifications, where the rate is 14.8%, five times higher than that of those with no education in the same age group, which stands at 3%. For young people whose education stopped at the primary level, the rate is 4.2%, compared to 7.2% for those with a lower secondary education and 10.2% for those with upper secondary education.²⁸

Lack of Employment and Youth Ingenuity in Urban Areas in Cameroon: A Case Study on the Impact of Counterfeit and Tax Fraud in Yaoundé (2000s Onwards)

²⁷ Erick Sourna Loumtouang, « Chômage des jeunes et stabilité sociopolitique au Cameroun de 1990 à nos jours », conférence du CODESRIA, sur *Le chômage des jeunes en Afrique*, Harare, 2015. www.academia.edu/15514192/

²⁸ <https://ecomatin.net/cameroun-face-a-un-taux-de-chomage-de-74-le-ministre-de-lemploi-plaide-pour-une-hausse-du-budget> consulté de 10/03/2025, Accessed, 11/03/2025.

Due to a lack of employment, urban youth have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity since the early 2000s. With the advent of new information and communication technologies, many of them have turned to counterfeiting in all its forms. While production occurs covertly, the commercialization of counterfeit goods takes place openly, particularly in public spaces such as around government buildings. The primary consequence has been the bankruptcy of music production houses and a sharp decline in mechanical reproduction rights (DRM). For instance, between 2003 and 2007, DRM revenue dropped by more than 120 million CFA francs.²⁹

The main players in music piracy are young men who roam the streets and government offices to sell counterfeit CDs. Since the end of the 2000s, the phenomenon has reached alarming proportions, causing concern among many observers. In the Etoudi neighborhood – home to the Presidency of the Republic – there are about ten clandestine counterfeiting studios and nearly a hundred CD sales points, mostly run by youth aged between 16 and 34. Some of these young people, who request anonymity, claim to have close relationships with police officers. These officers often act as informants or offer tacit support when they are apprehended.³⁰ In the same way that counterfeiting undermines the music industry in Yaoundé, the trade in fake stamps is another example of informality, or more specifically, illegality in the realm of youth employment.

The history of taxation teaches us that tax fraud is a problem that has existed throughout history and in all countries, undermining the state's ability to fund its coffers. The environments fostering this problem in Cameroon are diverse. However, the nature and reputation of these environments raise questions about the behavior of public authorities, given the over contradiction of ethics and morals. This illegal activity occurs in public spaces such as near government offices, markets, schools, etc. This paradoxical situation in Yaoundé shows that fraud – by its very nature covert – is being carried out in full view of the authorities responsible for preventing and prosecuting it. To operate, young people exhibit extreme ingenuity. They form networks with impressive organizational skills, mobilizing considerable human and logistical resources, and creating structures spread across various strategic locations in the city. According to our research, one of the most notable areas for this form of tax fraud in Cameroon is the “Province” neighborhood in the heart of Yaoundé. This central point in the Yaoundé 1st district houses major state institutions such as the Governor's office of the Centre Region, the Prefecture, the General Delegation for National Security, the Ministry of Employment and Professional Integration, and the Ministry of Youth and Civic Education. However, before delving further into the explanation of this observation, it is important to establish a clear conceptual framework to avoid misunderstandings regarding the terms “tax fraud” and “sale of fake tax stamps,” which may be used synonymously, though the debate over their equivalence persists. According to Cameroonian tax legislation, tax fraud refers to a taxpayer's illegal attempt to evade tax obligations, either partially or entirely, through unlawful means, resulting

²⁹ Sam MBENDE, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Cameroon Music Corporation, “The impact of fraud and counterfeiting on economic actors. The case of the music industry”, Customs seminar on the fight against fraud, counterfeiting and piracy in CEMAC, Douala, December 12, 2007.

³⁰ Anonymous.

in little or no taxes being paid. The sale of fake stamps, on the other hand, refers to the use of unauthorized stamps for commercial purposes. Given that both practices result in the loss of legitimate state revenue, they can be considered synonyms within the context of this work.

With this clarification, we can return to analyzing these illegal practices, particularly those near government offices where most of the state's administrative functions take place. These administrative functions include the authentication, certification, or legalization of school and academic diplomas, birth certificates, certificates of loss declaration, authorization for associations, identification documents, etc. Due to such functions, these services are consistently and often heavily solicited, with hundreds of users visiting them daily. However, how many of these individuals actually go to the designated government offices to resolve their issues? This question becomes more pertinent given the existence of parallel services run by mostly young people at the entrances to these government buildings. Upon the arrival of a user, these young individuals rush to offer a range of expedited services, which always require at least one tax stamp.

To avoid administrative delays, which are often deliberately prolonged, most users turn to these external "facilitators" who present themselves as quicker alternatives. Within minutes or hours, the user is satisfied when the facilitator returns with their documents authenticated by the relevant authority. Who employs these facilitators? How much do they earn? They are not part of the official public service in Cameroon. Therefore, it is clear that their compensation comes from illegal sources, such as the sale of counterfeit or recycled stamps.

Political will and the precarious employment situation for youths in Yaoundé

The ambivalence of the effects of "financial crime" in Cameroon reflects the paradox that ties this issue to the country's development. Tax fraud, smuggling, and counterfeiting raise the problem of the "illegality-morality" relationship. These activities are considered immoral offenses by the state. Economists, especially those who adhere to liberalism, also categorize them as immoral practices. Pascal Salin, for example, argues that they lack "moral or scientific justification³¹." While the moral dimension of these activities is lacking, the existential dimension is undeniable. A sociological study of this phenomenon reveals that many families depend on smuggling, tax fraud, and counterfeiting for their livelihood. According to Nkeng A Nkeng, counterfeiting, particularly in the music industry, meets the existential needs of impoverished social groups. The Cameroonian sociologist compares it to the drug trade, arguing, "Just as the drug market fuels a portion of the legitimate global economy, the piracy of musical works contributes to the functioning of the country's global economy" asserts that

32

³¹ Pascal Salin, *Le libéralisme*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000, p.517.

³² Joël Christian Nkeng A Nkeng, « Piraterie ou contrefaçon des œuvres musicales : facteurs explicatifs, modes opératoires et impact sur les artistes-musiciens à Yaoundé », mémoire de Matser II, Université de Yaoundé I, 2010, In www.memoireonline.com.

Such illegal activities, like the illicit trade in counterfeit music media, provide many unemployed young people with a way to stay occupied, preventing the detrimental effects of idleness and poverty.³³ In a broader sense, these illegal practices may be seen as substitutes for the welfare state, a state in crisis or disengaged. The silence of public authorities in the face of these financial crimes could suggest complicity on their part, driven by a political-social realism that seeks to reduce unemployment in a context where the labor market is not only scarce but also governed by patronage, discrimination, and networking. Some of the interviewed protagonists claim that the high tax rates create a toxic business climate in the country, explaining their choice to resort to fraud. Financial criminals argue, "If taxes, paid under coercion, are indistinguishable from theft, it follows that the state, which survives on taxes, is a vast criminal organization, far larger and more effective than any mafia...³⁴" This situation could be understood through the logic of "Financial crime is better, as it is non-violent, than violent crime, characterized by physical harm of any kind." Thus, between laxity and complicity, the attitude of the public authorities raises numerous questions. Confounding for some, collusion for others, the authorities' stance opens two possible doors. However, beyond this passivity, this attitude may not only explain the inertia but justify an unofficial policy by the Cameroonian government to preserve peace and stability, as some anonymous officials suggest.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this reflection was to examine the correlation between the absence of political will and the prevalence of illegal employment practices among youth in the city of Yaoundé since 1960. Until the mid-1990s, there was a notable lack of a targeted youth employment policy, and existing initiatives were largely limited to addressing rural exodus. As the youth population grew, urban unemployment became a significant challenge. The neo-liberal economic model adopted by the country at the end of the 1990s prompted the introduction of youth integration projects. However, due to a lack of sustained political will, these projects have largely failed to produce the anticipated results. As a result, many young people are opting for lucrative, although illegal, activities such as music piracy and tax evasion. The response of state authorities to these activities could, however, suggest a degree of complicity, indicating an implicit policy of criminalizing employment for the majority of educated youth. The intensification of this regressive dynamic could lead to a "generational rupture," potentially explosive in nature. Younger, more qualified generations are being forced into informal and illegal sectors, while older generations continue to dominate the formal job market...

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Murray Rothbard, *L'éthique de la liberté*, Paris, Edition les belles lettres, 2011.

REFERENCES

- Ahmadou Ahidjo, *Recueil des discours d'Ahmadou Ahidjo 1968-1973*, 3^e édition, ACAP n° 78 du 5/4/1971.
- Ayissi, Lucien, *Gouvernance camerounaise et lutte contre la pauvreté. Interpellations éthiques et propositions politiques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2009.
- Cameroun : la culture sacrifiée*, Collection Africultures, n°60, juillet-septembre, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2004.
- Kengne Fodouop (Sous la dir), *Economie informelle et développement dans les pays du sud à l'ère de la mondialisation*, Yaoundé, PUY, 2000.
- Mambou, Patrick, « Stratégie d'insertion des jeunes de la ville de Yaoundé », Mémoire du diplôme d'ingénieur statisticien et économique, ISSEA, Yaoundé, 2006.
- Murray Rothbard, *L'éthique de la liberté*, Paris, Edition les belles lettres, 2011.
- Salin Pascal, *Le libéralisme*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000.
- Missir di Lusignano, « La protection des intérêts financiers de la Communauté européenne et la lutte contre la criminalité financière », Rapport moral sur l'argent dans le monde 1996, Montchrestien, 1996,
- Passas D. Nelken, « The thin line between legitimate and criminal enterprises : subsidy frauds in the European Community », *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 19, n° 3 (avril 1993)
- Margin F, « Peut-on combattre la corruption dans les administrations douanières » ?, *Revue des douanes camerounaises*, n°22 octobre 2009.
- Nkeng a Nkeng Joël, « Piraterie ou contrefaçon des œuvres musicales : facteurs explicatifs, modes opératoires et impact sur les artistes-musiciens à Yaoundé », mémoire de Matser II, Université de Yaoundé I, 2010, www.memoireonline.com.